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INTRODUCTION

In 1988, candidate George H. W. Bush was in a tight race for
the presidency, behind in the polls to the Democratic challenger,
Michael Dukakis. Stung by the D+ grade given by the League of
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Conservation Voters, Bush was searching for a way to claw back some
of the environmental vote.' He saw an opening in wetlands.
Perceived as worthless swamps and wasted development
opportunities for most of our nation's history, 2 conversion of wetlands
for agricultural and urban land uses has resulted in a staggering loss
of resources. 3 Beginning in the 1970s, however, views started to
change, with growing recognition of the valuable services wetlands
provide to human populations-from flood protection and groundwater
recharge to wildlife habitat. 4 As a result, wetlands loss has
increasingly been denounced as the result of paving "paradise [to] put
5
up a parking lot."
Well aware of this widespread concern, Bush announced in a
major policy statement a national goal of "no net loss" of our nation's
wetlands. 6 This proved effective on the campaign trail, and, as
President a year later, he adopted the goal as official government
policy. 7 The Clinton Administration adopted this goal as well, going

1.
CRAIG PITTMAN & MATrTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA'S VANISHING WETLANDS
AND THE FAILURE OF No NET Loss 90 (2009).
2.
See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 787, 789-96 (2008) (reviewing the
history of government programs to drain and fill wetlands and of the courts' low regard for
swamps).
3.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has estimated that the contiguous forty-eight states
lost over half their wetlands land cover from the time of European settlement until the 1990s,
going from over 220 million acres to 107 million acres. JEFFREY ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WETLANDS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES 5 (2006). Conversion
to agriculture accounts for over eighty percent of those losses, but in the past several decades
loss to urbanization has taken over as the leading cause of wetland resource losses. T.E. DAHL,
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE COTERMINOUS
UNITED STATES 1998-2004, at 47 (2006) [hereinafter STATUS AND TRENDS]; ZINN & COPELAND,
supra, at 14. Even during the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, national wetland
losses exceeded 450,000 acres annually. DAHL, supra, at 15.
4.
See Brant Keller, What We Always Knew: Wetlands Win Hands Down at Pollution
Mitigation, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 12, 12; Sandra Postel & Stephen
Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 195, 196 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). As Hurricane Katrina made all too
evident, cumulative wetland loss along the Gulf coast degraded these services and led to loss of
life and property. See AFTER THE STORM: RESTORING AMERICA'S GULF COAST WETLANDS, A
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 1 (Gwen Arnold ed., 2006). Not
surprisingly, the most economically destructive flooding in New Orleans was on prior coastal
wetland areas that had been drained and developed. See Nature Destroys, But It Also Can
Protect, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 18, 18.
5.
JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise 1970).
6.
The political origins of the "no net loss" policy are meticulously detailed in PITTMAN &
WAITE, supra note 1, at 90-95. For more detail, see infra Part III.A.
7.
See, e.g., Memorandums of Agreement (MOA); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1);
Corrections, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 9210 (Mar. 12, 1990) ('The Domestic Policy Council, through its
Inter-Agency Task Force on Wetlands, of which both the Environmental Protection Agency and
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one step further by announcing a policy to achieve net increases in
wetlands of 100,000 acres per year by 2005.8 In 2004, President
George W. Bush set an even more challenging goal of a net increase of
more than three million acres in five years. 9 The "no net loss" policy,
with its various "net gain" additions, lived on in roughly the same
form through four very different administrations, and remains intact
in the Obama Administration. 0
This story provides a nice case study of clever campaigning, but
it raises an interesting question as well: Why has every president
since 1988 framed the wetlands policy goal this way?
After all, when announcing the policy in 1988 Bush could just
as easily have named other goals for wetlands with equally bold
declarations. He might have called for conserving an absolute number
of acres ("By the end of my first term, we will have 100 million acres of
wetlands conserved."), protecting the most important wetlands for
flood control ("At-risk cities such as New Orleans will remain
protected by their natural buffers."), or some type of cost-benefit
assessment of which wetlands to protect ("When development is most
important then we will allow construction, and when conservation

the Army Corps of Engineers are members, has been tasked by the President to develop
recommendations regarding attainment of the goal of no net loss of the Nation's wetlands."). The
original imprimatur of the "no net loss" policy is usually traced to a policy document the
Environmental Protection Agency and Army Corps of Engineers issued in 1990. See
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the Environmental
Protection Agency Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act
Section 404(B)(1) Guidelines, reprinted at 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (Mar. 12, 1990) [hereinafter 1990
Memorandum of Agreement], available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/
mitigate.cfm.
8.
The specific proposal was included in the Clinton Administration's 1998 Clean Water
Action Plan, which included "[a] coordinated strategy to achieve a net increase of 100,000
wetland acres a year by 2005, including a 50 percent increase in wetlands restored and enhanced
by the Corps of Engineers." Press Release, EPA, Clean Water Action Plan (Feb. 19, 1998),
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cwa/03.htm. Notably, no net gains were intended
or expected to be achieved until 2005, that is, not during any Clinton Administration. See
PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 98.
9.
Press Release, White House, President Announces Wetlands Initiative on Earth Day
(Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04
20040422-4.html. President Bush declared:
I'm committing our government to a new policy. We will move beyond the no net loss
of wetlands in America to having an overall increase of Americans' wetlands over the
next five years.... We can achieve this goal... . To do so, we will work to restore and
to improve and to protect at least three million acres of wetlands over the next five
years. First, we will restore at least.., one million acres of wetlands that do not exist
today.
Id.
10. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (describing "no net loss" of wetlands as a longstanding national goal
guiding federal policy).
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matters most the wetlands will be protected."). Despite these options,
and each has its own particular merits, the "no net loss" goal, now in
its third decade, remains firmly in place.
The goal of "no net loss" provides an example of a "historic
baseline." Policymakers identify some point in the past (even the very
recent past) whose conditions seem desirable today and going forward,
and use that baseline to ground the policy goal. Historic baselines
occur in a range of settings throughout regulatory law. For example:
The U.S. Census serves as a rolling population distribution
baseline for purposes of federal legislative allotments as well as
the distribution baseline for many other federal benefits. 1
gas emissions
The Kyoto Protocol for reductions of greenhouse
2
uses 1990 as the baseline for its targets.'
largely based on
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
13
averages of historic sentencing practices.
Wildlife refuge managers are committed to managing ecosystem
4
resources based on "historic conditions."'
Historic baselines seem to work well in these settings and are
used to frame policy standards across the government, from
determining the number of federal judges' 5 and the bandwidth law
enforcement agencies can use for electronic surveillance 6 to tax
reform,' 7 immigration quotas,' 8 and government budgets.' 9 But here is
11. See About Us, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/aboutus/ (last visited Nov.
4, 2010).
12. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3,
para. 1, opened for signatureDec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, availableat
http://unfccc.intlessential-backgroundlkyoto-protocol/items/1678.php.
13. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV, 1, 17 (1988). But see Marc Miller & Robert Wright, Your
Cheatin' Heart(Land): The Long Search For Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 723, 754-55 (1999) (arguing that the Guidelines were based on a more complex set of
factors).
14. See Policy on Maintaining the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental
Health of the National Wildlife Refuge System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,810, 3,818, 3,821 (Jan. 16, 2001).
15. The judicial council considers requests for adding judges to federal appellate circuits by
comparing the court's current caseload (measured by adjusted filings) to the "reasonable"
historical baseline of 500 adjusted filings per panel. See S. REP. No. 110-427, at 8 (2008).
16. Law enforcement agencies can only seek a certain bandwidth capacity for electronic
surveillance, and the amount they are able to seek is set by the historical baseline of capacity
used. See H.R. REP. No. 104-863, at 22 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
17. In 1986, 2005, and 2009, the tax reform process was bounded by policy that had
been set forth from above. In 2005, President Bush directed that the reform
committee consider various alternatives (income tax, consumption tax, hybrid
systems, etc.) but that the relative mix of tax burdens among each quintile remain the
same. The distributive burden as of 2004 was thus used as the historic baseline. The
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the key question: Why use historic baselines to frame the standard?
After all, when deciding whether to conserve wetlands, reduce
pollution, or pursue policy goals in many other settings, policymakers
face a choice. They know where they want to go, but there are several
routes they might take to get there. There is any number of ways to
use regulation to move parties from A to Z but, so long as the
regulated party ends up at Z, does it really matter how it got there?
Put simply, in the regulatory context, how does form influence
function?
Consider, for example, the regulation of a hazardous air
pollutant. Congress might pass a statute calling for a seven percent
reduction of Dimethyl Terrible below 1990 emission levels by the year
2020. This would be the historic baseline approach. But the policy
could rely equally well on a range of different approaches:
Standard Setting Approach

Expression of Standard

Absolute target: Specify a quantitative

The United States will emit no more than

limit

200 tons in the year 2020.

Risk-based: Specify acceptable risk levels

Emissions will be set at levels that
protect the public health.

Technology-based: Specify required

Emissions will be set at levels achievable

technological effort

using best available technology.

Cost-based: Specify desired cost-benefit
outcome

Emissions will be based at the
economically efficient level, where
benefits most exceed costs.

idea was that by removing the political question of how to distribute the tax burden
among rich, middle, and poor, the committee could focus on efficiency and
administrability. Cynics noted that the baseline included Bush's recently enacted
cuts, which were themselves a departure from historic baselines.
E-mail from Victor Fleischer, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law, to Jim
Salzman, Samuel F. Mordecai Professor of Law, Nicholas Inst. Professor of Envtl. Pol'y, Duke
Univ. (Feb. 13, 2010, 3:11 P.M.) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
18. The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants to two percent of the
number of people from that country already living in the United States in 1890. Office of the
Historian, Milestones: 1921-1936: The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921- 1936/ImmigrationAct (last visited Nov.
4, 2010). This effectively ensured that roughly seventy-five percent of future immigration would
come from Northwestern Europe. Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952: The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The McCarran-WalterAct), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/ImmigrationAct (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
19. The Congressional Budget Office baseline measures approximately what the federal
budget would be for the next ten years if all of the current policies and laws remained in effect.
BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. No. IB10096, CRS BRIEF FOR CONGRESS:
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACTIONS IN 2002, at 4, 7 (2002), available at http://www.
policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/776.pdf.
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Congress needs to settle on only one of these options. But how
should it make this decision? In particular, if all of these different
approaches yielded the same absolute levels of emissions, on what
basis should Congress decide which approach to take, and would it
even matter?
A great deal of scholarship exists on the theory and practice of
absolute, risk-based, technology-based, and cost-based methods of
defining regulatory standards, but that is not true of the historic
baseline method. To be sure, historic baselines receive plenty of
scholarly attention in other settings. The doctrine of stare decisis and
the evolution of the common law are both premised on a notion of
respect for the baseline of past decisions. So, too, in constitutional law
does the interpretive theory of Originalism seek to determine and hew
to the historic baseline meaning of constitutional text. 20 In the field of
regulation, by contrast, we have found no systematic treatment of the
theory and practice of historic baselines as a specific strategy of policy
development.
One might ask, so what? Why can one not simply apply what is
known about the other approaches to historic baselines? This Article
addresses those questions directly, showing that the unique qualities
of historic baselines establish them as distinct instruments in
regulatory policy warranting close attention. Unless one believes that
policymakers choose between alternative types of goals randomly, or
that it simply does not matter which they choose, each approach
deserves its own theoretical development in order to make better
choices and predict the comparative potential for success and failure.
This Article is the first to do so for historic baselines.
Our central inquiry is to examine what makes historic
baselines so attractive to Congress and the President in some contexts
but not in others. Historic baselines are found in many fields, from
budgeting and criminal sentencing to environmental protection and
land use, yet their particular attributes-what makes them
potentially different from other approaches-remain unexamined. We
do not see historic baselines used everywhere, so there must be a
converse question: How does reliance on a historic baseline introduce
constraints that might not be present with other types of goals? Put
another way, when are absolute target, risk-based, technology-based,
or cost-based standards more attractive than historic baselines?
To get at the heart of these questions, we use examples from
wetlands policy, the Kyoto Protocol, the Endangered Species Act,
20. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 395 (2007).
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climate change policy, and other regulated fields to examine the
attributes, design issues, and strategic uses and abuses of historic
baselines. The sections that follow provide a wide-ranging analysis of
historic baselines, identifying where they are used in the regulatory
landscape, why they are particularly attractive or unattractive to
policymakers, the different dimensions of such baselines and why
these matter, different strategies to game historic baselines, and,
taking this together, applying our insights to the emerging policy
debate over climate change.
Part I unpacks the structure and design of historic baselines.
Although not always made explicit, all historic baselines consist of
four core attributes: (1) a regulatory goal, (2) a temporal reference
point, (3) baseline metrics, and (4) a margin of deviation. Part I
examines how each of these attributes contributes to the effective
framing of the baseline, identifies the design issues particular to each,
and demonstrates the different forms historic baselines can take.
Part II explores the attractiveness of historic baselines. It
examines the features that make historic baselines preferable when
compared to risk, technology, or cost-based standards, as well as what
makes them relatively unattractive. Historic baselines surely offer
rhetorical benefits-goals that most anyone can understand more
readily than some measure of risk or parts per million. At the same
time, historic baselines assume an understanding of prior conditions
that may be unwarranted. They may also mask more than they reveal,
creating opportunities for rent-seeking by interest groups.
Part III explores the mechanisms of rent-seeking in more
detail, delving into the strategic gaming possibilities created by
historic baselines. Of course, all standard-setting approaches are
subject to gaming, but the temporal component of historic baselines
sets them apart from the other approaches and opens up qualitatively
different strategic opportunities. While historic baselines may seem
like innocuous, inert dates from the past, it turns out they are well
suited for intense gaming in ways that favor particular political or
economic interests, potentially diluting the effectiveness of the
baseline while appearing to anchor and guide regulatory policy.
Strategic framing of the unit of the baseline or the way in which
success toward achieving the target is measured can infuse
malleability into the baseline over the long term.
The "no net loss" of wetlands baseline described above, for
example, failed to specify what counts as a wetland, or even what
counts as loss, much less how we measure these. As discussed in Part
III, this imprecision has led to a debate ever since over the question,
"No net less of what? Wetland acres? Wetland function?" Baselines
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can also be used to favor particular interest groups by selecting
reference points, conditions, or targets amenable to their
circumstances. For example, the 1990 baseline commonly used for
greenhouse gas reductions in the Kyoto Protocol favored Eastern
European and former Soviet countries. 21 Given the collapse of their
economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain, this baseline amounted to
a subsidy to encourage these countries to sign. A baseline of 1985, for
example, would have been far less attractive.
To be clear, our examination of gaming opportunities is not
intended to generally praise or condemn historic baselines. In some
contexts using historic baselines to set regulatory standards might be
folly, and in others it might break policy logjams where no other
approach could. Hence, while describing the attributes, design, and
gaming of historic baselines is important for identifying how they
operate as a distinct policy instrument, the real test for the analytical
framework we build is whether it helps in understanding how
policymakers might usefully employ historic baselines in current
policy challenges.
To this end, Part IV aims the theoretical framework we have
developed at a practical context by examining the potential role of
historic baselines in climate change policy. Climate change poses
tremendous disruptions of the human and natural environments over
the coming decades, leading to social and environmental changes of a
character and magnitude not experienced in modern history. The
demand for action will require policymakers to consider a wide array
of regulatory goals for controlling greenhouse gas emissions,
sequestering carbon from the atmosphere, and adapting to climate
change impacts that cannot be avoided. Our analysis shows that
historic baselines will be an essential policy instrument for designing
approaches to limit greenhouse gas emissions and enhance carbon
sinks, but that they will prove unworkable or even counterproductive
in the context of climate change adaptation policy.
Oscar Wilde wryly observed that "the one charm of the past is
that it is the past."22 Given the ubiquity of historic baselines in the
administrative state, the past remains firmly in the present. Yet legal
scholarship has not developed a sophisticated theory for the practice of
historic baselines in the administrative state. This Article fills that
gap by building an analytical framework for understanding how

21. David G. Victor et al., The Kyoto Protocol Emission Allocations: Windfall Surpluses for
Russia and Ukraine, 49 CLIMATIC CHANGE 263, 263 (2001).
22. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 81 (Michael Patrick Gillsepie ed., W.W.
Norton & Co. 2d ed. 2007) (1891).
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historic baselines are designed and strategically employed in
regulatory policy. Given the potentially transformative effects and
massive scales of looming regulatory problems, such as climate
change, a deeper understanding of how historic baselines operate is
long overdue.
I.

WHAT ARE HISTORIC BASELINES?

Suppose that Congress, as part of its national climate change
policy initiative, decides that federal public lands should play a
significant role in promoting carbon sequestration.2 3 Congress could
simply specify "promoting carbon sequestration" as yet another goal
federal land management agencies must consider in management
decisions, or it could establish more specific targets. For example,
Congress could direct agencies to manage timber resources to
sequester a specified quantity of carbon each year, to give
management preference to the tree species with the greatest
sequestration potential, or to use cost-benefit analysis to design a new
management regime centered on carbon sequestration.
Assume, though, that Congress chose to use a historic baseline
as the means of establishing the carbon sequestration management
benchmark, much as President Bush did with wetlands. In this
Section, we focus on how Congress and agencies would construct such
a historic baseline. While using a point in time as a reference is a
fundamental aspect of historic baselines, there is more to designing a
baseline than just randomly picking a year from the past. Historic
baselines actually have discrete qualities and specific attributes that
23. Carbon sequestration is a form of climate change mitigation that focuses on increasing
sinks of carbon rather than reducing sources of carbon emissions. See INT'L PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WORKING GROUP III: MITIGATION, app. II, (2001) available at
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc-tar/?src=/climate/ipcc-tar/wg3/454.htm
("[Sequestration is] the process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than
the atmosphere. Biological approaches to sequestration include direct removal of carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere through land-use change, afforestation, reforestation, and practices that
enhance soil carbon in agriculture. Physical approaches include separation and disposal of
carbon dioxide from flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce hydrogen- (H2) and
carbon dioxide-rich fractions and long-term storage underground in depleted oil and gas
reservoirs, coal seams, and saline aquifers.") (emphasis omitted). Federal public land
management policy has recently turned attention to how the federal government's vast land
holdings could contribute to carbon sequestration through subsurface storage and through
storage in vegetative land cover. See DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAMEWORK FOR
GEOLOGIC CARBON SEQUESTRATION ON PUBLIC LAND IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 714 OF THE

ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT 1-2 (2009), available at http://groundwork
ROSS W. GORTE,
.iogcc.orglsites/default/files/Framework%20for%20Geological%20Storage.pdf;
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. No. RL31432, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN

FORESTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets /crs/RL31432.pdf.
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and
advantages
their
in understanding
important
prove
chart
below
The
disadvantages compared to other types of standards.
sets out the core attributes of historic baselines for carbon
sequestration in national forests. These attributes and the design
choices they provide are then explored in greater detail in the text
that follows.
Attribute

Design Questions

Regulatory goal

What is the purpose of the goal in sequestering
carbon on national forest lands? Can this be
adequately captured by a historic baseline?

Temporal reference
point

What set of conditions at a particular period in the
past best represents these conditions on national
forest lands?

Baseline metrics

What protocol and criteria should be used to measure
those conditions at the temporal reference point and
in the present and future?

Margin of deviation

What deviations from the conditions as they existed
at the temporal reference point will be tolerated?

A. Attributes
To begin with, all standards express a regulatory goal. In the
carbon sequestration scenario, the broad goal, of course, is to
sequester carbon in vegetation, usually forests. The very nature of the
goal may make historic baselines more or less attractive. If the goal is
economic efficiency or equity, then a historic baseline approach may
not make a lot of sense-a cost-benefit goal or multiple-use mandate
24
would be more appropriate.
An inherent feature of a historic baseline is that it does not use
a specific quantitative standard to express the goal, such as so many
million tons of carbon sequestered each year. Rather, a historic
baseline implies that a point in the past can serve as the foundation
for regulatory goals in the present and future. We may wish to
sequester as much carbon on national forest lands each year as in
1990, or in some other year of peak sequestration capacity. This goal
requires the creation of a temporal referencepoint.
Of course, a number of assumptions are embedded into such a
reference point. First, historic baselines assume that an ideal
24. The Clean Air Act's National Ambient Air Quality Standards, for example, require the
EPA to set standards that protect the public health within an adequate margin of safety. 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2008).
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temporal reference point can be defined. For the wetlands "no net loss"
baseline, that appeared easy-the temporal reference point was the
day President Bush issued the policy in 1990. But had the goal been to
restore wetlands to some past state of conditions, the question would
have been which year or period in the past best matched the
restoration goal.
The second assumption is that we actually know the conditions
in place at the time of the reference point. This requires that the
baseline incorporate a set of baseline metrics that define what
regulators believe are both the essential characteristics of the
regulatory goal and a reliable measurement of the past condition,
which may not be as easy as it seems. For one thing, if the conditions
occurred in the past, was monitoring at the time adequate to measure
the important metrics? If the wetlands policy goal had been no net loss
from wetlands coverage in 1950, there would have been significant
estimation concerns if data from that period were incomplete or
sketchy. In practice, the "no net loss" policy finessed the expression of
the temporal reference point by using the date of the policy
announcement. This policy choice avoids the problem of accurate
measurement of past conditions, but does not speak to the more
difficult questions-no net loss of what? What counts as a wetland,
and what is it about wetlands the baseline is counting? There is a
continuing debate over what exactly should be counted today as a
wetland for purposes of evaluating success in achieving the "no net
loss" goal. 25 Should the "no net loss" goal be considered no net loss of
wetland services, wetland function, or wetland acreage?
Moreover, assuming that conditions at the time of the temporal
reference point and thereafter can be reliably described and measured,
another assumption inherent in a historic baseline is that those
conditions can be achieved once again and maintained in the future
within some margin of deviation. Of course, any type of standard
assumes the regulatory goal can be successfully attained, but historic
baselines carry with them the fundamental reality that the past
seldom can be perfectly recreated and maintained. The "no net loss"
policy, for example, very pointedly did not preclude loss of any wetland
resources. Rather, it accommodated losses by requiring that they be
mitigated through restoration, enhancement, or preservation of other
wetland resources to achieve no net loss. 26 But does the policy allow
net losses of one type of wetland if mitigated with restoration of
another type of wetland? And does the policy allow net losses in one
25.
26.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
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area of a state if mitigated with restored wetlands in another part of
the state? Depending on how these questions are decided, the actual
wetland resources on the ground could deviate substantially from
those present at the time the federal government adopted the policy,
even while the "no net loss" goal is maintained in a broad sense.
To summarize, a historic baseline has four core attributes,
irrespective of whether it is addressing wetlands, toxic chemicals, or
budgets. The baseline must flow from a regulatory goal and be
anchored in a temporal reference point, measured by metrics to assess
progress toward the reference point, and cabined within a margin of
deviation from the reference point. Using these attributes,
policymakers have several design choices to make.
B. Design Choices
In practice, the historic baselines in our laws are shaped by
three basic design choices: (1) whether the temporal point of reference
is recent or ancient; (2) whether the baseline seeks to replicate
conditions at the temporal reference date or uses the baseline
conditions as a reference point from which to specify the regulatory
standard; and (3) whether the baseline is static or fluid. These choices,
in turn, are driven by the regulatory goals-different kinds of
baselines serve different purposes.
1. Ancient Versus Recent Baselines
The fundamental purpose of a historic baseline is to "anchor" a
standard using a reference point from the past. Our research revealed
that Congress and agencies tend to do so by using either recent
reference points or ancient reference points, with nothing in the
middle. Ancient baselines are perhaps the most controversial examples
of historic baselines, as they generally are associated with highly
normative statements about humans and the environment-that both
were somehow "better" a long, long time ago. As a result, they are also
the most abstract form of baseline. For example, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") proposed national wildlife refuge regulations
in 2000 to maintain the "biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health" of the refuges system. 2 7 To determine what
constitutes these three conditions, the proposed regulations adopted

27. Draft Policy on Maintaining Ecological Integrity of the National Wildlife Refuge
System, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,356, 61,356 (Oct. 17, 2000).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1:1

an ancient "natural conditions" baseline standard of implementation.
As the agency explained:
The holistic integration of these three qualities constitutes ecological integrity. The
concept of ecological integrity requires a frame of reference for natural conditions. Our
frame of reference extends from 800 AD to 1800 AD. The former date marked the
beginning of an ecological transformation associated with higher temperatures; the
latter approximates the advent of the industrial era, including drastic and widespread
habitat loss. In areas where pre-industrial European settlement was particularly
intensive, however, our frame of reference may be shorter. Natural conditions also
include those that would have persisted or evolved to the present time if European
natural
settlement and industrializationhad not occurred. At each refuge, we ascertain
28
conditions, assess current conditions, and strive to decrease the difference.

This kind of historic baseline has a clear goal and temporal
reference point. Underlying these, however, are unstated assumptions
that (1) the period from 800-1800 AD best defines natural conditions;
(2) the agency can employ a set of metrics that reliably measures
conditions of a particular refuge area in that period and compares
them to conditions of the refuge in the present; and (3) the difference
between then and now could be reduced to some acceptable margin of
deviation.
Each of those assumptions is problematic, however, which
helps explain why they were unstated. Indeed, in its final
promulgation of the rule, the FWS reported that "this concept clearly
created a catalyst for controversy among reviewers," with the "great
majority express[ing] strong concern. '"29 The agency attempted to
address the concerns by being more straightforward, replacing
"natural conditions" with the concept of "historic conditions," which
the agency described as "composition, structure, and functioning of
ecosystems resulting from natural processes that we believe, based on
sound professional judgment, were present prior to substantial human
related changes to the landscape. ' 30 Hence, while backing off the full
implications of "natural conditions," the FWS stuck to the position
that "a reference point is pivotal to compliance with the mandate [to] .
ensure the maintenance of biological diversity, integrity, and
environmental health. 3 1 The essence of this and other ancient
baselines, therefore, is to differentiate between modern conditions and
conditions from the distant and possibly even prehistoric past, in this
case between ecological conditions before and after significant human-

28. Id. at 61,359-60 (emphasis added).
29. Policy on Maintaining the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental Health of
the National Wildlife Refuge System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,810, 3,811 (Jan. 16, 2001).
30. Id. at 3,818.
31. Id. at 3,811.
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induced change, in order to define a pre-human environmental
baseline.
Most historic baselines ground the temporal reference point in
the recent past. The "no net loss" standard and rolling budget
baselines are obvious examples. Interestingly, we could find no
example of a historic baseline using a reference point between ancient
and recent time frames relevant to current generations of people.
Thus, for example, no regulatory baseline in effect today references
"1910" or "pre-World War I." Even the baselines discussed in the
context of climate change, where one might reasonably expect the
goals to reference a time before industrial greenhouse gas emissions
began to have effects on the climate system, fit the pattern through
the convoluted route of basing reductions off of recent temporal
reference points. In July 2009, for example, the G8 nations supported
a target to keep global temperatures from rising more than two
degrees Celsius from current levels. 32 A year earlier, the same group of
33
leaders had called for halving greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
This goal could have been framed much more directly as reductions
that meet a baseline year of, say, 1900. As discussed in Part II, the
reason for using this approach likely turns on the framing effect of
recency-that is, that people living today can relate to 1990 as a
reference point for additional reductions, whereas a baseline of 1900
would not resonate even though the two may be identical in terms of
emissions levels.
2. Specific Date Versus Percentage Target
While a historic baseline must fix a temporal reference point,
not all baselines stop there. Indeed, many historic baselines,
particularly in the pollution context, use the baseline date as the
fulcrum upon which percentage targets pivot. Thus the Kyoto Protocol
mandates that the United States reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
by 2012 to seven percent below the 1990 levels, while Australia is
allowed to increase its emissions eight percent above 1990 levels by
2012. The National Wildlife Refuge regulations' "historic conditions"
baseline described above, by contrast, is fixed. The FWS is not trying
to achieve eighty percent of historic conditions. In general, these fixed
baselines operate in the first instance as qualitative goals, such as the
32. Patrick Wintour & Larry Elliott, G8 Agrees to Climate Targets Despite Differences with
Developing Nations, GUARDIAN (London), July 8, 2009, at 14, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/j ul/08/g8-climate-carbon-emission-targets.
33. G8 Adopts Climate Change Goal for 2050, BRIDGES TRADE BIORES, July 11, 2008, at 6,
available at http://ictsd.orgli/news/bioresl12755.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: 1: 1

wetlands "no net loss" policy. The agency must then determine the
appropriate baseline metrics and margin of deviation to make this
work in practice.
So why prefer a specific date versus a percentage target? As
noted above, fixed dates work well when there are not good data about
the actual baseline date and the year serves as a proxy for a
qualitative state (for example, 1492 instead of pre-European
colonization). The "fulcrum" approach of percentage targets, by
contrast, allows a wide range of flexibility for goals that are quite
independent of the actual baseline conditions (for example, sixty,
eighty, or ninety-five percent of 1990 levels). Also, the percentage
approach allows policymakers to select a date that fits in the recent
past for purposes of providing a temporal reference point that
resonates in the public mind and memory, but then use the percentage
target to define the actual standard. As noted, for example, many of
the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets use 1990 as the
reference point and a percentage target to set a final emissions level.
If, by contrast, the target for a national aggregate emissions level was
keyed to the year in which the nation last met that level, the temporal
reference point would be 1910, and if per capita emissions were the
metric the temporal reference point would be 1875. 34 It is worth
noting, as well, that baselines also imply deadlines. Meeting a 1990
emissions deadline is much harder in 2012 than in 2050. Therefore,
the timing of the deadline plays a fundamental role in baseline design.
3. Static Versus Fluid
The final design choice turns on whether the baseline is fixed
in time or explicitly designed to change over time. A historic baseline
can be made fluid through mechanisms such as rolling period
averages or periodic adjustment using specified standards. To
expressly recognize new knowledge and more precise measurement
techniques, for example, the baseline could ratchet up every ten years.
In principle, this approach builds flexibility into the baseline to
accommodate changes in conditions. As a result, rolling baselines can
have a longer life, making them both anchored and adaptive. This
flexibility provides an effective way to keep the standard moving.
These baselines generally start with a specific benchmark
period, but then move over time to reflect what might be natural

34. Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise in Unreality,
ENERGY & ENV'T. OUTLOOK (Am. Ent. Inst. Pub. Pol'y Research, Washington, D.C.), July 2009, at
1, 3-4, available at http:/www.aei.org/docLib/EEO-03-July-09-g.pdf.
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variability in conditions, budget levels, or changes in knowledge about
whatever is being measured. A number of river management
baselines, for example, account for variations in wet and dry years by
35
using flow data averaged over rolling periods of consecutive years,
and the federal budgeting process has used a rolling baseline to
estimate federal spending and receipts during a fiscal year under
36
existing policies.
Using the carbon sequestration scenario described at the
beginning of Part I as an example, the baseline attributes and types
outlined above can be meaningfully summarized in the chart below:
Design Choice
Attribute

Ancient versus recent

Fixed versus percentage
benchmark

Static versus fluid

Regulatory
goal

Manage national forests
to achieve sequestration
levels under "natural
conditions" versus under
conditions taking human
presence into account

Manage national forests
based on carbon
sequestration conditions
that existed at the
reference point versus
some percentage thereof

Manage each national
forest to achieve and
maintain its maximum
past sequestration
capacity versus allowing
the level to change over
time

Temporal
reference
point

Use a period of preEuropean settlement or
pre-human settlement
versus a more recent date,
such as 1995

Use the reference point
as the level versus as
the fulcrum from which
to set percentage goals

Stick with the original
reference point versus
allow it to adjust under
some formula, such as a
rolling ten-year average

Baseline
metrics

Likely the same under
either approach, though
metrics for recent
reference points may
allow more precise
measurement

Likely the same under
either approach

Likely the same under
either approach

Margin of
deviation

Likely higher for ancient
baselines given the
impossibility of
replicating pre-European
or pre-human conditions

Possibly high depending
on how different year X
is from present

Possibly high depending
on how different year X
is from present

35. Monitoring and Data on Minnesota's Rivers, MINN. SHORELINE MGMT. RESOURCE
GUIDE, http:llwww.d.umn.edul-seawwwldepthlrivers/24.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
36. See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO. 98-560 GOV, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: BASELINES AND SCOREKEEPING IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 1-2 (rev. Dec. 8,
2006), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-560.pdf ("Discretionary spending is
assumed to continue at the level of the current year's spending level adjusted 'sequentially and
cumulatively' for inflation and other factors.").
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II. WHY HISTORIC BASELINES?
Assume, for a moment, that you are the legislative aide to the
ranking Senator in the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
You have been asked to draft a bill to reduce a particular pollutant.
You know where you want to end up-reduce the twenty tons emitted
today to fifteen tons of total emissions in 2012. Sitting down to
translate the idea into statutory text, though, you realize that you can
end up at fifteen tons using any number of goals. You wonder to
yourself, "If the final endpoint is fifteen tons, does it really matter
whether I use an absolute goal, a 25 percent reduction from the
current level of twenty tons, a risk-based approach, or the best
available technology? So long as the legislation gets the regulated
community to the same final number, who cares how they get there?"
You would also face very similar questions if you were conserving a
natural resource, such as wetlands or forest cover.
In this thought experiment, why would you favor one type of
goal over another? Surprisingly, in our discussions with legislative
aides working in Congress, this type of explicit deliberation among
types of goals rarely seems to take place, hence the reason for writing
this Article. Make no mistake, though; an implicit calculation does
occur. If all that mattered were the final number, then one might
expect a random distribution of statutory goal types. Therefore, in
practice, some types of goals must prove more suitable in particular
circumstances than others. This Section explores why the form of the
statutory goal makes a functional difference. In particular, it breaks
out the likely benefits and disadvantages of using historic baselines to
express statutory goals. As this Section will show, more generally the
type of goal illuminates certain comparisons by suppressing others.
A. Why Use Historic Baselines?
1. If the Shoe Fits ....
The most obvious reason to choose a historic baseline as the
statutory goal is that there is no choice but to do so. If the express goal
is a qualitative state from the past, there is no obvious number to set.
As described above, for example, the FWS strives to manage the
nation's wildlife refuges toward a baseline of "historic conditions."
This baseline does not lend itself to precise numbers of species
assemblage or population numbers, at least not at the statutory level.
There is no other way to manage for historic conditions than to use a
historic baseline. Pointed toward the historical period, the agency,
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whether the FWS or the Park Service, then can play its expert role to
track disturbances and ecological succession back in time and figure
out as best it can what the ecosystem looked like prior to 1492.
2. Understandability
Compared to other types of goals, historic baselines can be
homespun
a
certain
offer
They
effective.
rhetorically
understandability. The public gets the idea of returning Wildlife
Refuges or National Parks to their state prior to European
colonization. There is a "bumper-sticker appeal" to the phrase, "Save
Our Wilderness." The implicit idea behind any historic baseline is that
we (or at least our forebears) were there once before and, most
important, can get there again. Historic baselines draw a line in the
sand, but a line that everyone can understand and, more important,
relate to. They reassure both those who seek increased environmental
protection (that progress is being made) and those who seek
reassurance from change (that the world as they know it is not being
destroyed). The result is incremental change anchored in a known
state.
Contrast, for example, the goal of returning carbon dioxide to
pre-industrial levels with the goal of returning carbon dioxide
concentrations to a level of 280 parts per million ("ppm"). In practical
terms, these goals are saying the same thing but do so to very
different effect. As Don Elliott has observed, "who will fight or
sacrifice for 280 ppm?"37 Indeed, much of the recent greenhouse gas
debate has turned on whether the emissions target should be twice or
three times pre-industrial levels, presumably for this very reason. To
take another example, when describing the acid rain trading program
under the Clean Air Act, one can equally talk about ten million tons of
sulfur dioxide or a fifty percent reduction from 1990 levels. 38 In the
public debate, the ten million tons figure gets much less play.
Moreover, while undoubtedly more precise, there is an
arbitrariness to naked numbers. Why 280 ppm instead of 290 ppm?
No one asks this type of question about pre-industrial America. The

37. Telephone Interview with Donald Elliott, Partner at Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher and
former General Counsel of the EPA (Oct. 7, 2009). However, the organization 350.org has been
staging events around the globe supporting the absolute target goal of 350 ppm. See 350.ORG,
http://www.350.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). Upon closer examination, however, the goal of 350
ppm turns out to be derived from a historic baseline. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying
text.
38. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006)).
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meaning of that baseline, at least upon first glance, seems selfevident, certainly compared to an absolute concentration or risk-based
calculation. From a political point of view, from the perspective of
selling an idea to an electorate, this is no small matter. As a candidate
in 1988, Bush sensed this public perception with his "no net loss"
wetlands policy, and no president since him has dared to abandon that
approach for an express number of acres.
As noted earlier, baselines often are coupled with deadlines,
and distant targets off historic baselines are politically attractive.
Negotiating any short- or medium-term international agreements to
reduce greenhouse gases has proven remarkably challenging. Yet the
G8 nations had no trouble agreeing by consensus in 2008 that they
will reduce their emissions fifty percent by 2050. 39 Accountability
helps explain the preference for historic baselines with targets far into
the future over those with shorter-term obligations. By the time 2050
rolls around, the G8 leaders will surely not be in office, and may not
even be alive.
3. Return to Eden
Scholars of the American environmental movement have often
noted a clear strand of rhetoric that is hostile to technological and
industrial development. 40 Whether romanticizing the noble savage of a
simpler time or imagining a landscape untrammeled by humans, the
message is clear: modern society has despoiled our landscape. It is no
exaggeration to state that much environmentalist rhetoric harkens
back to an ideal of a Golden Age. Environmental groups engaged in
the perennial debates over drilling for oil in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge, for example, routinely refer to the area as America's
41
"Eden."Historian
William Cronon has demonstrated this best, noting
that many writers capitalize "Nature," as though it exists as a formal
Platonic norm.

39. Interestingly, they did not specify the baseline year, making the goal much more flexible
than first appears. See Wintour & Elliott, supra note 32 ("In a fudge designed to recognise the
difficulties different rich countries will face in meeting this target, the agreed G8 communique
released at the L'Aquila summit set a fuzzy baseline for their 80% cut 'of 1990 or more later
years.' The communique also acknowledges baselines may vary but 'efforts must be
comparable.' ").

40.

See, e.g., Edward Abbey, THE MONKEY WRENCH GANG (1975); Roderick Nash,

WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 222 (4th ed. 2001).

41. See, for example, the website on the Refuge from the group, Restoring Eden,
See also, e.g., YELLOWSTONE:
http:l/www.restoringeden.org/campaigns/ANWRANWRQA.
AMERICA'S EDEN (Scandinature Films 1997).
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[A] great many environmental controversies revolve around... . "Edenic narratives," in
which an original pristine nature is lost through some culpable human act that results
in environmental degradation and moral jeopardy. The tale may be one of paradise lost
or paradise regained, but the role of the narrative is always to project onto actual
physical nature one of the most powerful and value-laden fables in the Western
intellectual tradition. The myth of Eden describes a perfect landscape, a place so benign
and beautiful and good that the imperative to preserve or restore it could be questioned
encourages us to celebrate
only by those who ally themselves with evil. Nature as Eden
42
a particular landscape as the ultimate garden of the world.

Hence the common desire to turn back the clock and restore
some public lands to a "natural state" implicitly defined the
environment before Europeans. The unstated premise is that humans
necessarily have negative effects on the environment. This logic helps
explain the appeal of historic baselines. By analogy to a human body,
historic baselines return things to a prior state of health. Yet there is
a vast literature on the inherent difficulty of actually identifying a
"natural conditions" reference point, as European colonists clearly
transformed the environment but so, too, did Native Americans
through hunting practices and their use of fire. 43 Beavers transformed

42. UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 37 (William Cronon
ed., 1995); see also Jedediah Purdy, Politics of Nature, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1175 (2010) (noting
that, for environmentalists, "a register of moral and aesthetic response elevated the wild and
spectacular above the settled and mechanical, demoting the latter as ugly and uninspiring").
43. John A. Stanturf et al., Fire in the Southern Forest Landscape, in DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
FOREST SERV., SOUTHERN FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 608-09 (John G. Greis & David N.
Wear eds., 2002), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/sustain/reportpdf//chapter_- 25e.pdf. The
degree to which Native Americans altered grassland ecosystems prior to European settlement is
controversial. See CHARLES MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS
(2005). There is a raging debate among ecological historians as to the impact early human
inhabitants of the continent had on the surrounding flora and fauna. In particular, they disagree as
to causes of the rapid extinction of the rich array of megafauna that were found on the continent
around the time the first human migrations to North America are believed to have occurred (about
13,000 years ago). Was it the deadly Clovis point, used expertly by early native hunters, or climate
change, or species competition, or an extraterrestrial object strike? See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Gill et al.,
Pleistocene Megafaunal Collapse, Novel Plant Communities, and Enhanced Fire Regimes in North
America, 326 SCIENCE 1100, 1100-03 (2009) (arguing that megafaunal decline started prior to
human intervention and triggered fires, not the reverse); Donald K. Grayson & John Alroy, Did
Human Hunting Cause Mass Extinction?, 294 SCIENCE 1459, 1459-62 (2001) (presenting a series of
letters debating the question); Vance Holliday, Where Have All the Mammoth Gone?, 300 SCIENCE
1373, 1373-74 (2003) (reviewing and questioning recent studies); Christopher Johnson,
Megafaunal Decline and Fall, 326 SCIENCE 1072, 1072-73 (2009) (discussing different theories);
Richard A. Kerr, Megafauna Died from Big Kill, Not Big Chill, 300 SCIENCE 885, 885 (2003)
(discussing research suggesting that humans arrived in North America just before the time of
the megafauna collapse, and that the collapse preceded the era of massive climate change
beginning 10,000 years ago); Martyn Murray, Overkill and Sustainable Use, 299 SCIENCE 1851,
1851-53 (2003) (discussing evidence of unsustainable hunting). In any event, there is little debate
that the largest set of impacts on the Great Plains has been the post-European settlement
introductions of widespread irrigated agriculture, intensive domestic cattle and sheep grazing, and
concerted fire suppression. Background on the ongoing degradation of North American grasslands
attributable to these factors is available in NAT'L BIOLOGICAL SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, OUR
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the forests of the Northeast. 44 When settling on a natural baseline,
why privilege some particular states over others? Why define as
optimal the carbon dioxide levels prior to the industrial age instead of
thirty or forty years after the advent of the Industrial Revolution?
These are valid, and difficult, questions but they are masked by
reliance on a baselines approach.
Part of historic baselines' appeal also probably derives from the
endowment effect. Clearly demonstrated in both experiments and
everyday life, the endowment effect is a cognitive bias that values
personal goods at a higher value than non-personal goods. The classic
demonstration is an experiment asking subjects to identify their
willingness to accept payment for a coffee mug they have just been
given. Time and again, the payment they demand for the mug in hand
proves higher than their willingness to pay for the same mug from
someone else. 45 Parting with something they own, that has somehow
become a part of them, adds a greater value to the object. Similarly,
historic baselines build off a part of our past, whether imagined or
real. Either we or our ancestors lived at the time of the reference point
and experienced those conditions. Historic baselines thus harken back
to our past in a personal way. This approach resonates far more
deeply, far more personally, than absolute numbers or risk-based
goals ever could.
Nor should this effect be surprising. There is extensive
psychology and social science literature, and a growing focus in legal
scholarship, on the importance of "framing effects," which occur "when
individuals-often reasonably sophisticated and otherwise rational
substantively
frequently
maintain
and
individuals-make
inconsistent choices depending upon the manner in which the choices

(1995), available at http:/Abiology.usgs.gov/status-trends/
LIVING RESOURCES 295-307
staticcontentdocuments/olrdocs/Intro.pdf, and WORLD RES. INST., A GUIDE TO WORLD RESOURCES
2000-2001: PEOPLE AND ECOSYSTEMS 119-31 (2000), available at http://pdf.wri.org/world_
resources_2000-2001peopleandecosystems.pdf. For epic accounts of the ecological history of our
continent, including the interaction of early human inhabitants and their surroundings, see
generally TIM FLANNERY, THE ETERNAL FRONTIER: AN ECOLOGICAL HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA
AND ITS PEOPLES (2001); DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR'S SHADow: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF

WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1999). An excellent history of the social, physical, and ecological conditions
associated with grazing on the American rangelands is found in DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN
RANGE REVISITED 1-160 (1999).

44. See Jamison E. Colburn, Bioregional Conservation May Mean Taking Habitat, 37
ENVTL. L. 249, 259-60 (2007) (noting that the beaver is a species with "extraordinary ecological
impact").
45. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329-36 (1990).
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are framed." 46 Experiments in the early 1980s by Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman focused on how the expression, or framing, of
problems adopted by decisionmakers results in part from extrinsic
manipulation of the decision options offered and in part from forces47
intrinsic to the decisionmakers, such as their norms and biases.
lead to
Different framings can send vastly different messages and can
48
overlooked.
not
have
politicians
effect
an
outcomes,
different
Historic baselines offer political institutions another framing
option for articulating policy goals in a way that conveys a different
context to the public than the alternatives of absolute, risk-based,
technology-based, or cost-based targets. Curiously, as noted earlier,
historic baselines either are set in the recent past (such as 1990) or
the ancient past (pre-industrial). We have not found any baselines in
between, that is, between several hundred years ago and one
generation ago. American law does not rely on baselines from 1820 or
1930. One reason behind this pattern may be that we relate much
more strongly to reference points drawn from our own past or from an
imagined, Edenic past than from the years in between. Historic
baselines are likely of greatest framing value when the policy goal can
be expressed through an ancient or recent historic reference point.
4. Managing Uncertainty
Use of historic baselines also provides a useful way to set a goal
in the face of uncertainty. Setting a greenhouse gas goal at the preindustrial baseline or, more realistically, at twice the pre-industrial
baseline provides a specific target when broader policy goals, such as a
"safe" or "optimal" level of gases, are fraught with uncertainty.
Climate modeling is simply too imprecise to provide a single,
generally-agreed upon number for what constitutes safe or
economically efficient atmospheric concentrations. Reliance on a
historic baseline, by contrast, sidesteps this technical challenge. In
simple terms, reliance on historic baselines allows policymakers to

46. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters,Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradoxof Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX
REV. 797, 798 (2005).
47. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453-58 (1981).
48. Zelinski, for example, recounts the story of the Michigan legislature, in the summer of
2003, "decree[ing] that the state's 'tax expenditure' budget shall henceforth be denoted as the
governor's report on 'tax credits, deductions, and exemptions.' " Zelinski, supra note 46, at 798.
Zelinski contends that "[this name change was not an inadvertent or technical adjustment but
reflected a concerted effort by Michigan opponents of tax expenditure analysis to jettison what
they believe is a misleading label." Id.
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start with a back-of-the-envelope estimate based on common
understandings of a qualitative goal and then go from there. That was
the essence of the wetlands "no net loss" policy at its origins. This
approach masks uncertainty.
5. Halting Degradation
Another way that historic baselines can manage uncertainty is
through a static or "no net loss" approach. Here the advantage is one
of a defensive posture. Just as the Hippocratic Oath directs doctors to
"first, do no harm," so, too, can historic baselines fixed at the present
or recent past serve to halt an undesirable trend. When a policymaker
does not yet know what the "right" number is but is confident things
are heading in the wrong direction, "no net loss" serves as an
attractive heuristic to stop making things worse. Again, candidate
Bush tapped into a nerve of the public consciousness with those three
simple words.
6. Managing Regulated Party Strategic Behavior
Historic baselines also can serve a "hold everything" purpose as
policymakers attempt to preclude strategic behavior of regulated
entities in dynamic regulatory environments. As David Dana has
identified in the land development context, for example, developers
who believe a local jurisdiction is likely to adopt more restrictive
regulations in the near future will engage in a "race to develop" to
avoid the new restrictions. 49 Anticipating this move, many local
jurisdictions have countered by adopting development moratoria as
soon as the prospect of new regulation is put on the table. 50 This form
of "no net loss" historic baseline prohibits new development pending
the adoption of the new regulations, at which point the moratorium is
lifted. These temporary moratoria "prevent developers and
landowners from racing to carry out development that is destructive of
51
the community's interests before a new plan goes into effect."
Recognizing these and other planning benefits, the courts generally
have rejected the argument that such moratoria inherently constitute

49. David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655,
656 (1995).
50. See, e.g., Bradfordville Phipps Ltd. P'ship v. Leon Cnty., 804 So. 2d 464, 465-66 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (adopting a moratorium while considering zoning changes).
51. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 777 (9th
Cir. 2000), affd 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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temporary takings of property for which compensation must be
52
provided.
B. The Disadvantagesof Historic Baselines
Given all the advantages of historic baselines described in the
preceding Section, one might assume that historic baselines should
serve as the default approach for regulatory goals. In practice, though,
while baselines are common, they are hardly universal. Why don't we
see baselines everywhere? This Section explores some of the
downsides to reliance on a historic baseline.
1. If the Shoe Doesn't Fit ....
In contrast to when historic baselines are an obvious choice, in
some situations they are obviously a poor choice. If there are
overriding policy concerns about safety, cost, or risk, then historic
baselines may prove a clumsy or ineffective goal. It is difficult to use a
historic baseline goal that maximizes safety. If one is concerned about
exposure to toxics such as benzene, for example, then the goal should
be to limit exposure to benzene levels that are safe or present cancer
risks of, say, one in one million, not a goal of reducing exposure to
workplace levels in 1970, or even of reducing exposure by ninety
percent compared to 1990 levels. Similarly, baseline goals do not
account well for costs or technical feasibility (a proxy of cost). A best
available technology standard may work much better for emissions
than aiming for particular historic levels achieved by what surely is no
longer the best available technology. Put simply, if concerns over
safety, efficiency, technological adequacy, or risk are paramount, then
baseline goals may be poor substitutes for safety-based, cost-based, or
other types of standards.

52. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 33640 (2002) (rejecting the argument that a temporary moratorium is a "per se" taking of property
under the Fifth Amendment). The Tahoe-Sierra Court left open the possibility that the
moratorium device could be abused and thus constitute a taking. See Laurel A. Firestone,
Comment, Temporary Moratoria And Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277,
287-88 (2003) (discussing the advantages of an ad hoc analysis). Some state courts have found
moratoria to violate state constitutional protections. See, e.g., Biggers v. City of Bainbridge
Island, 169 P.3d 14 (2007) (striking down the temporary shoreline development moratorium at
issue and dividing on the broader question of whether a local government has authority to adopt
a moratorium during long-term land-use planning).
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2. Inadequate Knowledge
Setting a historic baseline implicitly assumes we know what
the conditions were at that point. This assumption is sometimes
advantageous because we have more confidence about historic
conditions than about what constitutes safe or efficient conditions.
However, reliance on baselines can be counterproductive. This can
occur because the wrong date is chosen or because the wrong
assumptions are made about the past. As Randy Olsen has described
in the context of fisheries:
Among environmentalists, a baseline is an important reference point for measuring the
health of ecosystems. It provides information against which to evaluate change. It's how
things used to be. It is the tall grass prairies filled with buffalo, the swamps of Florida
teeming with bird life and the rivers of the Northwest packed with salmon. In an ideal
world, the baseline for any given habitat would be what was there before humans had
much impact. If we know the baseline for a degraded ecosystem, we can work to restore
it. But if the baseline shifted before we really had a chance to chart it, then we can end
up accepting a degraded state as normal--or even as an improvement.
The number of salmon in the Pacific Northwest's Columbia River today is twice what it
was in the 1930s. That sounds great-if the 1930s are your baseline. But salmon in the
Columbia River in the 1930s were only 10% of what they were in the 1800s. The 1930s
numbers reflect a baseline that had already shifted...
One of scientists' biggest concerns is that the baselines have shifted for many ocean
ecosystems. What this means is that people are now visiting degraded coastal
environments and calling them beautiful, unaware of how they used to look.
People go diving today in California kelp beds that are devoid of the large black sea
bass, broomtailed groupers and sheephead that used to fill them. And they surface with
big smiles on their faces because it is still a visually stunning experience to dive 53in a
kelp bed. But all the veterans can think is, 'You should have seen it in the old days.'

In the case of the Colorado Compact, for example, western
states allocated Colorado River water based on the flow years of 18991920. 54 Each state's allocation was an absolute amount. The problem,
however, was that this temporal reference point represented a
historically high period of river flow. In normal years, well before the
clear impacts of climate change, the mean river flow was much less.

53. Randy Olson, Op-Ed., Shifting Baselines: Slow Motion Disaster in the Sea, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2002, at M2, available at www.actionbioscience.org/environmentolson.html; see also
Thomas T. Ankersen & Kevin E. Regan, Shifting Baselines and Backsliding Benchmarks: The
Need for a National Environmental Legacy Act to Address the Ecologies of Restoration, Resilience,
and Reconciliation, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 53 (David M. Driesen & Alyson C. Flournoy eds., 2010) (describing the
problems associated with shifting baselines generally).
54. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Colo. River Comm'n 73 (Jan. 30, 1922), available at
http://www.colorado.educolorado-river/docs/compact/meetingO6.pdf.
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As a result, lower river states locked themselves into an unfair
55
allocation from the outset.
In these cases and others, setting the reference point assumes
a conception of what was desirable when, in fact, the wrong period had
been chosen. We may be identifying a past that was already terrible
and that we do not, in fact, want to reach or, conversely, was
unusually good and that the environment will not reach again. In this
respect, baselines can sell themselves short.
3. Arbitrary Nature and Lack of Transparency
Just as absolute goals can have an arbitrary appearance, so,
too, can historic baselines. While historic baselines may sound
ambitious or desirable, they may not prove so at all. For example, why
not assess how close we can get to zero deaths from typhoid, instead of
a ninety percent reduction compared to 1930 levels? For some types of
harms, historic baselines may not provide any useful anchoring. What
were typhoid deaths in 1930? This date is too far back from
contemporary reference yet not far back enough to provide a
comprehensible qualitative goal (such as pre-industrial).
As Leon Billings has observed, environmental policy is all
about making practical compromises in moving toward risk-free
goals. 56 Using numeric targets and qualitative goals based on cost or
risk make these compromises and trade-offs explicit. This is arguably
a more honest and open approach than relying on historic baselines,
which can hide more than they show.
Similarly, it may be politically easier not to settle on a baseline.
In particular, as explained below in Part III, certain dates may favor
one interest over another. In the case of baseline years for the Kyoto
Protocol, a date before 1990 effectively provided a subsidy for former
Soviet countries while a later baseline would have removed this
benefit. If a political deal could not have been reached about this
subsidy, then a different type of goal, such as technology transfer,
could have ensured agreement while pushing off this dispute for
resolution at a later date.
And baselines can be contested. Consider, for example, a
controversy currently playing out in the Point Reyes National
55. See, e.g., The Compact and Lees Ferry, WESTERN WATER ASSESSMENT, http:I/wwa.
colorado.edu/treeflow/lees/compact.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) ("In other words, the Colorado
River has been over-allocated. There is not enough water in the river, on average, to fulfill all of
the legal entitlements.").
56. Telephone Interview with Donald Elliott, Partner at Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher and
former General Counsel of the EPA (Oct. 7, 2009).
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Seashore, just north of San Francisco. 57 The National Park Service has
decided not to renew the permit of the Drakes Bay Oyster Company
when it expires in 2012. Because the land is designated as "potential
wilderness," the Park Service has an obligation to eliminate intrusive
commercial activity. Drakes Bay is a seventy year-old oyster farm,
predating creation of the National Seashore. It argues that it is "part
of the historical working landscape of the area-and every bit in need
of protection as the harbor seals and eelgrass that share the bay."5 8 Is
the proper baseline the historic use of the area or pre-human
history? 59
III. GAMING HISTORIC BASELINES
We have left for its own separate consideration a critical aspect
of historic baselines that can provide both benefit and disadvantage.
Historic baselines can furnish significant political cover for gaming,
hiding a wide range of decisions that provide flexibility to
decisionmakers, either significantly softening or strengthening the
goal. Viewed in a positive light, this cover creates space for making
deals and, in a negative light, maximizes opportunities for rentseeking. In answering the question to which we keep returning-why
would a legislator, government executive, or agency official prefer one
type of standard over another?-a significant part of the answer lies in
the opportunities for gaming that are particular to historic baselines,
to which this Article now turns in Part III.
We use the term "gaming" in a specific sense. We do not mean
the ability to interpret language in different ways. As H.L.A. Hart
famously showed in his example of "no vehicles in the park," any rule
allows for a range of interpretative meanings. 60 That is inherent in the
use of language. Rather, by gaming we mean the deliberate selection
and design of a standard that will allow regulators significant
flexibility to maneuver policy as desired while appearing to establish
and abide by a seemingly inflexible standard. Gaming allows
regulators and legislators to satisfy multiple constituencies at the
same time by appearing to set a specific goal and then making it
harder or easier to attain than would first appear.
57. Leslie Kaufman, Debate Flares on Limits of Nature and Commerce in Parks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at A24. The authors thank Rob Glicksman for his assistance in identifying
this example.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125-27 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d
ed. 1994) (1961).
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To be sure, all standards provide for a certain level of gaming.
Our focus, though, is on whether historic baselines provide for more or
different gaming opportunities. Framed in a practical example, this
Section seeks to determine whether the "no net loss" wetlands historic
baseline over the past twenty years has provided a different and, for
the circumstances, more useful quality of policy flexibility than could
have been achieved under alternatives such as a quantitative
standard (conserve 100 million acres) or a qualitative standard
(conserve the best wetlands).
This Section draws from the practice of historic baselines to
explore the opportunities for gaming. It starts with an in-depth case
study of the "no net loss" wetlands policy goal. It then examines how
each of the other three attributes identified in Part I-(1) the
conditions at the temporal reference point; (2) the baseline metrics for
describing the standard; and (3) the margin of deviation-was gamed
in the "no net loss" policy. To show that the analysis is representative
of other cases, similar examples of historic baseline gaming are also
presented from the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Air Act, the Wilderness
Act, and the Endangered Species Act. As detailed below, what sets
historic baselines apart from the other types of standards is the use of
the past to guide the future. By adopting a temporal reference point,
historic baselines create additional flexibility for regulators to
maneuver policy outcomes.
A. The History of the "No Net Loss" Wetlands Loss Policy
As described in the Introduction, in his 1988 campaign, locked
in a tight race for the presidency, candidate George H. W. Bush "was
just hungry for environmental ideas."61 Bush, an avid duck hunter,
regretted some of his environmental responsibilities as Vice President
and the resulting bad press. 62 With advisors telling him that water
was a promising front for innovation in environmental policy,
candidate Bush declared to Sports Afield magazine, "My position on
wetlands is straightforward. All existing wetlands, no matter how
small, should be preserved."63 From this bold statement grew the "no
net loss" policy.
Conveniently for the campaign, the work of the National
Wetlands Policy Forum task force, which had several Bush advisors in

61. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 93 (quoting William K. Reilly, then an advisor to the
campaign).
62. Id. at 90.
63. Id. at 91 (quoting presidential candidate George H.W. Bush).
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its ranks, was nearing completion. 64 The task force had been formed to
review Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the target of
significant controversy during the Reagan Administration. 65 Section
404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army, through the
Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), to "issue permits for the discharge of
dredged or fill material in the navigable waters of the United States at
specified disposal sites."66 Although the Corps is the front-line
regulatory agency for administering this permit program, pursuant to
Section 404(b)(1) of the CWA, the EPA must promulgate substantive
permitting standards focused on environmental factors, known as the
"404(b)(1) Guidelines," which the Corps must follow when issuing
permits for disposal of dredged or fill material. 67 Under Section 404(c),
the EPA also may deny (or "veto") any disposal site if the discharge
"will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas."68 Thus, under Section 404, and
subject to specified exceptions, wetlands subject to federal jurisdiction
may be filled only if the Corps grants a permit in accordance with the
EPA's 404(b)(1) Guidelines. These permits, known ubiquitously as
"404 permits," "wetland permits," or "Corps permits," have become the
cornerstone for federal protection of wetland resources, and many
states implement similar programs to cover wetland resources not
69
within the scope of the federal program.
By the end of the Reagan Administration, the Section 404
program had become vilified by development industry interests and a
political target in Congress. In 1987, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas
asked the Conservation Foundation think tank to convene a task
force, the previously mentioned National Wetlands Policy Forum, to
forge a solution. 70 Borrowing from New Jersey's experience with
aquatic resource protection policy, the task force's report adopted the
simple idea that "any taking of wetlands would be replaced by the
64.

For a complete history of the task force, a group of twenty state and local officials,

environmentalists, and land developers, see RESOLVE, INC., CASE: NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY

FORUM (2003), available at http://www.resolv.org/experience/caseslpdfs/wetlands.pdf
the task force process in detail).
65.

PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 92.

66.
67.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2008).
Id. § 1344(b).

68.

Id. § 1344(c).

(describing

69. For background on the scope of federal wetlands regulation, see Douglas R. Williams &
Kim Dana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY:
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, at 1,1-26 (Kim Dana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
70. See PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 91-93 (describing the Foundation's initial
efforts).
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addition of wetlands somewhere else." 71 The brilliance of the idea was
that it would drive policy toward an "equilibrium between losses and
gains" to achieve "no overall net loss of the nation's remaining wetland
base." 72 With this as an interim goal, the task force recommended net
73
increases in the long term.
The Bush campaign gravitated immediately to the flexibility of
the "no net loss" component of the task force recommendation. On
August 31, 1988, while fishing in Lake Erie, Bush spoke about how
important wetlands are to hunters and fishers, then proclaimed that
"one state has a policy of 'no net loss' of wetlands, and it has
worked .... [a]nd that state is not a no-growth, no development state.
74
I believe this should be our national goal-no net loss of wetlands."
Candidate Michael Dukakis ridiculed the speech as an "election year
conversion," but the next day Bush famously toured the murky waters
of Boston Harbor to slam his opponent's own environmental
performance. 75 "No net loss" thereafter was never far from candidate
Bush's lips; indeed, candidate Bush was reportedly far out in front of
his advisors in committing to "no net loss."76
Bush undoubtedly saw advantages in "no net loss" he could not
have achieved in the election by committing to another standard. It
allowed him to appeal to multiple constituencies without alienating
any: conservative and independent conservationists such as hunting
and fishing enthusiasts would endorse the conservation message,
while land development and property rights supporters would endorse
the flexibility of the macro-scaled national standard that did not
explicitly incorporate a restoration goal. But the real gaming began
almost immediately after Bush won the election.
In implementing a "no net loss" policy, the EPA and the Corps
added four additional twists to the campaign promises, each of which
parallels the essential baseline attributes identified in Part I. First, to
solidify the policy as a fixed baseline, the agencies described it as "the
national goal of no overall net loss of the nation's remaining wetlands
base," 77 with no mention of future net gains as a goal. 78 This addressed

71. Id. at 93.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 94 (quoting from various original sources).
75. Id. at 95.
76. See id. ("It was, in fact, beyond what the other members of Bush's administration would
put up with.").
77. Memorandums of Agreement (MOA); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1); Corrections, 55
Fed. Reg. 9,210, 9,211 (Mar. 12, 1990).
78. Id. at 9,210-13 (no mention of restoration).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1:1

the regulatory goal attribute. Second, the agencies explained that
their contribution toward "no net loss" would be through
implementation of a Section 404 "goal of no net loss of values and
functions,"' 79 thus blurring whether the baseline metrics would be
functional values or acreage. This addressed the baseline metrics
attribute. Third, the agencies drove home the macro scale of the policy
by stating that "it is recognized that no net loss of wetlands functions
and values may not be achieved in each and every permit action."80
This addressed the margin of deviation attribute.
In the final and most significant strategic move of joint
implementation, the agencies enshrined compensatory mitigation and
opened the door to the new concept of wetlands mitigation banking
("WMB"), which addressed all of the baseline attributes. WMB does
not merely allow but depends on replacement of wetlands filled at one
site by restoration of large contiguous areas of wetlands at potentially
distant locations. 8' When a land development project involves filling of
wetland areas regulated under Section 404 of the CWA, the Corps
usually requires compensatory mitigation for the loss of wetland
functions as a condition of approval. 82 Permittees traditionally have
accomplished this compensatory mitigation directly through creation
or enhancement of wetlands on the development site (onsite
mitigation) or on an offsite location (offsite mitigation), or by paying a
fee to fund wetland mitigation by a third party conservation entity in
lieu of providing direct mitigation (in-lieu fee mitigation).8 3 WMB,
which arose in the mid-1990s and is now a dominant mitigation
method, provides a third-party variation on offsite mitigation by
allowing the developer to compensate for the resource loss by
purchasing "credits" from another landowner-the wetland bankerwho has created or enhanced wetland resources elsewhere.8 4 As a

79. Id. at 9,211.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 9,212.
82. For history and background on the compensatory mitigation program, see JESSICA
WILKINSON & JARED THOMPSON, ENVTL. L. INST., 2005 STATUS REPORT ON COMPENSATORY

MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Where It Comes from, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS
ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15 (2009).

83.

For detailed explanations of each type of compensatory mitigation, see ENVTL L. INST.,

BANKS AND FEES: THE STATUS OF OFF-SITE MITIGATION

IN THE UNITED STATES (2002);

WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 82; Royal C. Gardner, Mitigation, in WETLANDS LAW AND
POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404, at 253,253-82 (Kim Dana Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
84. For the history and structure of wetland mitigation banking, see MICHAEL BEAN ET AL.,
ENVTL. L. INST. & ENVTL. DEF., DESIGN OF U.S. HABITAT BANKING SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE
CONSERVATION OF WILDLIFE HABITAT AND AT-RISK SPECIES 29-120 (2008) (including survey of
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result of these four moves, just months after Bush had taken office the
"no net loss" historic baseline was infused with tremendous policy
flexibility.
The office of the Vice President sought to get involved as well,
though in a less nuanced approach to gaming that sought to redefine
the baseline metrics. Vice President Dan Quayle, chairing the
Competitiveness Council, tried to change what counted as a wetland.
Quayle coordinated an effort to have the Corps revise what is known
as the "wetlands delineation manual."85 Wetlands, left undefined in
the CWA, were defined in Corps regulations at the time as lands
"inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency or
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. '8 6 The Corps implemented this water-plantssoils test in the field through the delineation manual. Simply changing
the definition in the manual, therefore, could dramatically change the
"no net loss" baseline. In August 1991, the Corps and the EPA did just
that,8 7 promptly igniting a firestorm of controversy with the charge
this time being that the rules were too restrictive. 88 Facing relentless
criticism, the Corps and the EPA did not finalize the proposal and
reverted to the 1987 Manual, which Congress later mandated be used

state practices and comprehensive bibliographies); ENVTL. L. INST., WETLAND MITIGATION
BANKING (1993); Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking,
and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1993).
85. The Wetlands Delineation Manual is a guidance document for determining the presence
of wetlands at a project site. Its tortured history begins with its first published version in 1987,
which was applied on an ad hoc basis around the nation in Corps field offices. See ENvTL. LAB.,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, TECHNICAL REPORT No. Y-87-1, CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLANDS
DELINEATION MANUAL (1987), available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/ops/regulatory/reg_
manual.asp. In 1989, the Corps and several other federal agencies issued an Interagency
Wetlands Delineation Manual in response to criticism that the agencies were using inconsistent
standards to identify jurisdictional wetlands under various statutes. Critics of the 1989 manual
claimed that it greatly expanded regulatory jurisdiction, which was borne out by its application.
See, e.g., Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the Corps
found 230 acres of jurisdiction wetlands on a 470-acre parcel under the 1989 manual after
revoking a prior delineation under the 1987 manual that found only seventeen acres of
jurisdictional wetlands). This controversy set the stage for a reversal by the Bush
Administration.
86. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2010).
87. Proposed Revisions to 1989 Wetlands Manual, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (Aug. 14, 1991); see
also United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing history).
88. See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POL'Y, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A FAIR,
FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993) (discussing history), available at http://www.
wetlands.comlfed/aug93wet.htm. The new manual's approach to delineation, it was estimated by
one Corps biologist at the time, would have excluded half of the Everglades from coverage under
Section 404. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 97.
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until a final manual is adopted.8 9 The 1987 Manual remains in effect
to this day. 90
President Clinton made no similar mistake, promising even to
produce net gains in wetlands. Like him, his successors in the Oval
Office have also left "no let loss" alone, relying on its inherent
flexibility to provide room for the agencies to implement the
compensatory mitigation program. Indeed, over time the workhorse of
the "no net loss" policy-mitigation banking-has only strengthened
in its position. 91 Given the amount of gaming in how the policy was
designed and applied, however, one must go beyond the mere fact of
longevity and ask a harder question-has no net loss really worked?
That question can be answered on several levels. The first is
the obvious: Has there been no net loss of wetlands? Focusing on acres
as the metric, the answer is, roughly, yes. Separate studies by the
Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Resource Conservation
Service have demonstrated that the annual net loss rate had fallen
from 500,000 acres annually thirty years before to slight gains under
the "no net loss policy." 92

89. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-377, 106
Stat. 1315, 1324 (1992). For President Bush the plan backfired as well, as candidate Bill Clinton
relentlessly pinned Bush's environmental record to the effort to hand over half of the nation's
wetlands to developers. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 100.
90. See United States. v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 803 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) (deferring to the 1987
manual).
91. In 2008 the Corps and the EPA jointly published rules overhauling their compensatory
mitigation program under Section 404 and securing mitigation banking as the preferred
approach. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332 (2010); 40 C.F.R. § 230; see also Compensatory Mitigation for
Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts.
325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (describing the final rule). For a comprehensive review of the
new rules, see Symposium, Biodiversity Protection and Mitigation: Mitigation Regulation
Articles, 38 STETSON L. REV. 213 (2009).
92. As the Congressional Research Service has summarized:
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service periodically surveys national net trends in wetland
acreage using the National Wetlands Inventory (NWI). It has estimated that when
European settlers first arrived, wetland acreage in the area that would become the 48
states was more than 220 million acres, or about 5% of the total land area. By 2004,
total wetland acreage was estimated to be 107.7 million acres, according to data it
presented in its most recent survey. Data compiled by the NRCS and the FWS in
separate surveys and using different methodologies have identified similar trends.
Both show that the annual net loss rate dropped from almost 500,000 acres annually
nearly three decades ago to slight net annual gains in recent years. The FWS survey
estimated the average annual gain between 1998 and 2004 was 32,000 acres,
primarily associated with the expansion of shallow ponds, while NRCS (using its
Natural Resources Inventory (NR1) of privately-owned lands) estimated that there
was an average annual gain of 26,000 acres between 1997 and 2002. NRCS cautioned
against making precise claims of net increases because of statistical uncertainties.
Some environmentalists caution that the increases identified in the latest FWS data
are tied to a proliferation of small ponds rather than natural wetlands.
ZINN & COPELAND, supranote 3, at 5 (footnote call number omitted).
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The official policy of the EPA and the Corps, however, is to
count "values and functions," and on those metrics intense
disagreement remains over whether the standard has been met. A
study we compiled in 2000 demonstrated that the agencies had no
coherent methodology for counting functions or values, and rendered
the vast majority of their compensatory mitigation decisions by simply
counting acres. 93 Indeed, to this day no national accounting of wetland
functions and values exists to reliably evaluate whether no net loss
has occurred, and Corps officials have openly conceded that the agency
"cannot demonstrate or document we have achieved it." 94 Local and
regional case studies invariably show net losses at those scales, 95 and
the National Research Council concluded in 2001 that the
compensatory mitigation system was essentially a failure in this
96
respect.
Moreover, the distribution of functions and values across the
landscape unquestionably has been transformed. In 2006, we
conducted a comprehensive study of WMB-based compensatory
mitigation in Florida, which showed that wetlands systematically had
been filled in densely-populated coastal urban areas and "replaced"
with wetlands in sparsely-populated rural areas, with an average
distance between fill and mitigation sites of over fifteen miles. 97 Our
findings have since been replicated in other states. 98 Compensatory
mitigation thus has led to widespread wetlands migration. Whether
this trend should be cause for concern is a complex question. There is
no question, though, that the "no net loss" policy, pitched as a national
approach tied to 1990 levels, has provided the Corps and the EPA
ample flexibility to implement the policy according to a wide array of
agency objectives while still technically abiding by the standard. One
cynically might say, therefore, the "no net loss" historic baseline has
"worked" on all levels-exactly the way it was intended.

93. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611-12 (2000).
94. PITTMAN & WAITE, supra note 1, at 100 (quoting then-Assistant Secretary of the Army
John Paul Woodley, Jr.).
95. See, e.g., R. Eugene Turner et al., Count It by Acre or Function-MitigationAdds up to
Net Losses of Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 5, 5.
96.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN

WATER ACT 2-3 (2001).
97. See J.B. Ruhi & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetlands Mitigation Banking on People,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 1, 8-13.
98. See J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman & Iris Goodman, Implementing the New Ecosystem
Services Mandate of the Section 404 Compensatory Mitigation Program-A Catalyst for
Advancing Science and Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 251, 258-59 (2009) (summarizing studies that
demonstrate similar findings in other states).
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B. The Strategy of Gaming HistoricBaselines
We now turn to a closer examination of the specific gaming
strategies, starting in each case with the "no net loss" example but
adding cases from other settings as well, to illustrate the different
ways such a strategy can be used.
1. Gaming the Temporal Reference Point
Perhaps the most important gaming opportunity provided by
historic baselines that other types of standards cannot employ is
history itself-in particular, the malleability and obscurity of history.
In addition to using the "no net loss" policy to illustrate this point, we
provide two other cases below.
a. No Net Loss, After Losing 100 Million Acres
In the wetlands policy context, any attempt to fix a numeric- or
risk-based standard in 1990 likely would have touched off a political
battle. If the number proposed had been, for example, 100 million
acres of wetlands, which was roughly what was thought to be the
number of acres at the time, questions about the right number, proper
metric, and desired focus (for example, why not focus on restoration to
a larger number) all would have been spotlighted. If the proposal had
been to provide a sliding scale of protection based on quality of
wetlands, questions about the scale, the qualities that matter most,
and whether to focus on enhancing the quality of wetlands all would
have been raised. Had the policy adopted a historic baseline date of
1900, there would have been the question of how many acres (or
functions and values) existed in 1900. There is little agreement even
to this day about any of those questions, hence those approaches
would not likely have given candidate Bush or his successors much of
a policy with which to work.
With a "no net loss" standard pegged to the date of
implementation (1990), by contrast, no president using the policy has
ever had to pin down a number or differentiate between wetlands. The
baseline is whatever wetlands were there in 1990. Knowing the
absolute number of acres in 1990 may not even be necessary, because
applying "no net loss" means the number-whatever it wastheoretically stays constant and one simply measures subsequent
gains and losses. The vexing questions surrounding restoration and
enhancement were rhetorically obscured beneath this bold line in
history the policy drew. The 100 million acres of wetlands the nation
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had lost up until 1990 were in the unfortunate past. "No net loss"
drew a line in the sand. It triumphantly put an end to more losses and
would keep it that way in perpetuity.
An even more telling effect of "no net loss" on wetlands policy is
that it has allowed administrations to proclaim "net gain" policies. 9 9
Viewed through a longer time horizon, however, claims of any "gain"
are deceptive. At best, it is just a small recoupment of wetlands lost
prior to 1990. Moreover, the fundamental question remains-no net
loss or net gain of what? Nonetheless, the policy and WMB remain
standing proud. As far as gaming a standard on its face goes, "no net
loss" has been nothing short of brilliant-its flexibility made possible
by the temporal reference point.
b. The Kyoto Protocol and the Magic of 1990
The Kyoto Protocol and climate change offer another example
of the gaming made possible through temporal reference points.
Although the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, the baseline year
was up for grabs. Data sufficient for establishing baselines went back
environmental
several years. As with many international
negotiations, a fundamental challenge lies in ensuring that a
sufficient number of countries become parties to the treaty. There
must be sufficient inducements for parties to join, all the while not
undermining the very goals of the treaty in the first place.
As described earlier, the Kyoto Protocol set 1990 as the
baseline year for carbon dioxide emissions reductions. Parties to the
Protocol chose this date explicitly because it pre-dated the fall of the
Iron Curtain. The collapse of Soviet economies after 1990 meant that
these countries had effectively been given emissions reduction credits
they could sell at a later date. 100
Put another way, because countries in economic transition
currently emit at levels far below their levels in 1990, many of these
countries will not emit their assigned amounts under the Kyoto
Protocol, even assuming they take no steps to reduce greenhouse gases.
Under the Protocol, these countries may be permitted to sell this
so-called "hot air" to other Kyoto parties with emissions reduction
obligations. Elimination of this 'loophole" would have increased the
amount of emissions reduction actually needed to reach the target level.

99. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
100. It is interesting to note that a later baseline was chosen for different gases. In fact, 1995
was set as the baseline year for three relatively minor but potent greenhouse gases
(hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride).
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It is likely that, without the availability of "hot air" credits, the United
States and several other countries would have adopted less stringent
targets. Thus, the choice of baseline year in 1990 served both as an
inducement for former Soviet bloc countries to sign the treaty and as a
general subsidy to kick-start the program into effect.
c. Salmon and the EndangeredSpecies Act
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") offers a minefield of
historic baselines ripe for this kind of gaming. For example, Section 4
of the ESA requires the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries
Service ("NMFS") to identify endangered species, 10 1 which the statute
defines as any species "in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range.' 10 2 Although this mandate is forwardlooking, it is difficult to know where a species is headed without also
looking into its past and recent trends. Nevertheless, a battle ensued
between courts and the agencies during the Bush Administration over
how to select historical baseline reference points for the "range"
component of the standard. The Ninth Circuit explained in 2001 that
a species "can be extinct 'throughout . . . a significant portion of its
range' if there are any major geographical areas in which it was no
longer viable but once was."'1 3 On behalf of the FWS, however, the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior took the position that the
plain meaning of the statute required "range" to mean "current
range", not "historical range." This is because "to say a species 'is in
danger' in an area where it no longer exists-i.e., in its historical
range-would be inconsistent with common usage.' 10 4 Of course, a
sign that a species might be endangered may be that it no longer
exists in many places it used to call its range. Moreover, the agency's
"current range" approach means that a species' range could be
shrinking continuously but that would never show up in the
significant portion of range analysis, making the approach even less
demanding than a "no net loss" baseline. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
since reiterated that it expects the FWS "first to quantify. .. historical
range in order to establish a 'temporal baseline,' and then to
determine whether the lost habitat, measured against that baseline,

101. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2008).
102. Id. § 1532(6).
103. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).
104. Memorandum from Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Director, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., On the Meaning of "In Danger of Extinction Throughout All or a Significant
Portion of its Range" 7-8, (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinionsM37013.pdf.
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amounts to a significant portion of the species' overall range." 10 5 Also,
a long list of scientists has urged the Obama Administration to adopt
the "historic range" baseline approach. 10 6 Regardless of which
statutory interpretation is most faithful to text and congressional
intent, the episode speaks volumes about the impact gaming of
reference points can have on implementation of historic baselines.
Also subject to reference point gaming is the baseline approach
taken under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, which prohibits federal
agencies from engaging in or approving actions that jeopardize the
continued existence of a species listed under Section 4.107 An agency
contemplating such an action must consult with the FWS or the
NMFS (if the species is a marine species or anadromous fish) and
request an opinion on whether the actions are prohibited under the
Act. 108 These so-called "biological opinions" must assess the impacts of
the proposed activity when added to an "environmental baseline,"
which is defined as "the past and present impacts of all Federal, State,
or private actions and other human activities in the action area, the
anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area
. . . and the impact of State or private actions which are
contemporaneous with the consultation in progress." 10 9 By
incorporating "the past," this baseline opens the door to reference
point gaming. For example, when preparing a 1993 biological opinion
on the salmon mortality effects of hydropower dam operations in the
Columbia River basin, the NMFS measured the projected effects of the
operations against an environmental baseline period of 1986-1990,
which the agency justified as a period of "consistent management
practices" for the dams. 110 That period, however, was unusually short
compared to baselines the agency had used in previous consultations
on the dams, and it just so happened to encompass a period of low
salmon abundance.
The combined effect was to make the comparison between
baseline period salmon population and projected 1993 salmon
population look more favorable than had the NMFS used a longer

105. Tucson Herpetological Soc'y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2009).
106. Letter from Erica Antill et al. to Ken Salazar, Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior (Dec. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/cleaning-upthe-bushilegacy/pdfs/
Scientistsletter on SPOIRMemo.pdf (arguing that the current range approach "sharply limits
the scope of the ESA").
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
108. Id. § 1536(b).
109. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2010).
110. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 892 (D.
Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
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baseline period, which would have included years of higher salmon
abundance. The reference point gaming thus allowed the NMFS to
conclude that no jeopardy would occur. The court reviewing the action
described the agency as having "selected this critical variable in its
jeopardy equation by reference to 'consistent management practices,' a
factor which necessarily focuses more upon system capability than
upon the needs of the species."1 1' 1 Putting it more frankly, Professor
Michael Blumm has described the agency's move as a manipulation
that "finessed its jeopardy analysis, blinding itself from scientific
reality."1 1 2 It was also not an isolated example, with the FWS and the
NMFS several years later committing the same "finessing" of the
baseline reference period for consultations over irrigation reservoir
1 13
operations in the Klamath River Basin.
2. Gaming the Baseline Metrics
Gaming the temporal reference point depends in part on the
relative uncertainty about the past compared to the present. But even
if perfect knowledge is available about conditions in the past, historic
baselines can still be gamed by manipulating the baseline metrics.
The most blatant example is Quayle's failed effort to alter the
wetlands delineation criteria. But "no net loss" was a shell game from
the start. The Corps and the EPA quickly gamed the metrics by
claiming to measure "functions and values," all the while counting
acres as their proxies. 14 While easy to measure, acres are a poor proxy
for value or function, since they tell nothing about the type of wetland,
its location, or its service provision. 1 5 Pinning down whether "no net
loss" has been achieved has thus remained an ongoing debate. Every
administration has nonetheless claimed success and produced
numbers and reports purporting to show it.
Moreover, the metrics of the "no net loss" policy were scaled at
the national level while the metrics of agency implementation were
scaled at the project permit level. By adopting a nationally scaled
historic baseline, "no net loss" established a macro perspective so that

111. Id. at 893.
112. Michael C. Blumm et al., Practiced in the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia
Basin Salmon Recovery Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709, 736-37 (2006).
113. See A. Dan Tarlock, Ecosystem Services in the Klamath Basin: Battlefield Casualties or
the Future?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 240 (2007) (explaining that the FWS "designated a
relatively wet period... as the baseline").
114. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
115. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 93, at 648-67 (examining market constraints in
wetlands mitigation banking).
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not every individual project would necessarily come out at no net loss.
This took pressure off of individual project permit decisions and
n6
opened the door to compensatory mitigation through WMB.
Similarly, the environmental baseline approach used in the
ESA consultation process discussed above is susceptible to
manipulation of baseline metrics. The purpose of the baseline is to
serve as the reference point for impact analysis, with the question
being whether the new impacts caused- by the project under
consultation, when added to the baseline impacts, would jeopardize
the species. Therefore, even when the temporal reference point for the
baseline is set appropriately, "what information is included in the
environmental baseline often determines whether the agency will find
that the action jeopardizes a listed species." 117 For example, in
litigation reviewing several of the NMFS's Columbia River salmon "no
jeopardy" biological opinions, courts have rejected the agency's
rationales for excluding different kinds of ongoing impacts from the
environmental baseline. The concern has been that the exclusions
would render the environmental baseline a "vacuum," all but assuring
review in the
that the additional impacts of dam operations under
18
jeopardy.
to
species
the
tip
not
would
consultation
3. Gaming the Margin of Deviation
Everyone knows that the past never completely repeats itself,
so historic baselines inherently contain some margin of deviation from
the standard. But how much deviation is tolerable? Adopting numericor risk-based standards brings the slippage question to center stage.
Historic baselines, by contrast, can allow a more nuanced approach to
margins of deviation. For example, with "no net loss," policy success
was assessed only at the national scale, and no individual project was
invariably held accountable to the national policy. The incorporation
of wetlands mitigation banking also suspended any requirement that
compensatory wetlands had to be close to the filled wetlands. As a
result, the national "no net loss" baseline was detached from any

116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117. Matthew Gerhart, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: The Difficulty of
Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 177 (2009) (examining the difficulty of baseline
metrics for climate change impacts).
118. Nat'l. Wildlife Fed'n. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 929-30 (9th Cir.
2008) (discussing similar cases). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam,
Imposing Judicial Restraints on the "Art of Deception" The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on
Columbia Basin Salmon RestorationEfforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47, 52-53 (2008) (discussing the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning).
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potential local "no net loss" baseline. As our studies and others have
shown, this has led to significant net losses of wetlands on numerous
local and regional scales. 119 It is only when net gains experienced in
the other areas through compensatory mitigation are counted that the
"no net loss" standard (in acres) is achieved at the national scale. In
short, no net loss nationally does not mean no net loss everywhere in
the nation-a margin of deviation intentionally incorporated into the
policy to facilitate the permitting process.
a. GrandfatheringUnder the Clean Air Act
Under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), whenever a new source with
significant emissions arises or an existing source undergoes major
modification that results in significant emissions of a criteria
pollutant, the facility must undergo a process known as New Source
Review ("NSR"). In simple terms, this review determines which
pollution control technologies must be installed. NSR is generally an
expensive proposition and one that industry would like to avoid. In the
1977 amendments to the CAA, plants operating prior to 1970 were
exempted from NSR. 120 This exemption created a whole category of socalled "grandfathered" sources that did not have to comply with more
stringent CAA requirements going forward.
Why were new and existing stationary sources treated
differently? Part of the reason was clearly political. Existing source
owners and operators had much more clout in Congress than parties
who would operate plants in the future. Part was fairness, given the
high cost of retro-fitting an existing plant. And part was convenience,
since it was assumed that this exemption would not be of long-term
importance. The grandfathered plants would shut down over time to
make way for more modern, efficient, and cleaner facilities.
One can also view the story of grandfathering as an extreme
baseline gaming strategy. The grandfathering provision effectively
says that plants operating prior to 1970 have a 100 percent margin of
deviation privilege. So long as the new source and major modification
emissions thresholds are not triggered, the plants operate in the pre1977 CAA world and are exempted from NSR. Indeed, in practice the
law was extensively gamed. Grandfathering created an incentive to
keep older facilities operating as long as possible, and many coal-fired

119. See Karl Blankenship, 'No Net Loss' Proves to Be an Elusive Wetlands Goal, 4
CHESAPEAKE BAY J., Apr. 1994, para. 4, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article.
cfm?article=168 (examining the "no net loss" baseline in the Chesapeake Bay wetland program).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2008).

20111

GAMING THE PAST

utilities did just this. Under the guise of minor modifications, utilities
quite literally rebuilt their facilities to extend their life, all the while
121
continuing to benefit from being grandfathered.
b. The Clean Air Act and Dirty Old Cars
As part of the CAA of 1970, Congress used a historic baseline to
set a strikingly ambitious goal. Car manufacturers were required to
reduce ninety percent of carbon monoxide ("CO") and hydrocarbon
("HC") emissions by 1975.122 Ambitious goals are uncommon in
environmental law, but certainly not unheard of. What was unheard
of, however, was the authority granted to the EPA effectively to shut
down the auto industry if the goals were not met. The "technologyforcing" story is the subject of the famous case, International
Harvester v. Ruckelshaus.123 Our interest is less in the game of highstakes chicken between the EPA and the Big Three automakers than
in how the goal was gamed.
As Jon-Mark Stensvaag has well described, the EPA's
guidelines for assessing compliance significantly favored the auto
industry. For starters, the baseline levels of CO and HC were not the
regulatory standards for these emissions already in place in 1970, but
rather actual vehicle emissions. As a result, "this approach put a
premium on noncompliance in 1970, and resulted in more lenient

standards for

1975."124

Second, in testing compliance, inspectors

examined prototype models built specifically for testing, not cars off
the production line. Third, compliance was met by averaging the test
results rather than requiring each car to pass. When cars off the
assembly line were tested, up to forty percent of the cars were allowed
to fail. Perhaps most surprising, during the testing of prototypes for
the 50,000 mile test, manufacturers were allowed to replace the
catalytic converter once-something that rarely happens in practice.
Stensvaag points out other favorable testing protocols as well, but the
point is clear: the use of a target based off a historic baseline
introduced enormous flexibility to take what appeared to be an

121. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 544-45 (4th Cir. 2005)
vacated, 549 U.S. 561 (holding that revisions over a twelve-year period, some costing many times
the price of the original facility, did not trigger the major modifications emissions threshold).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(A).
123. Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
TEACHER'S
124. JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 283-286 (1999).
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extremely strict target and weaken it in application, all the while
125
hiding this from the general public.
c.

The Wilderness Act

Signed into law in 1964, the Wilderness Act contains some of
the most lyrical language found in any environmental law, calling for
the protection of natural areas "where the earth and community of life
are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain."126 In particular, Congress declared that undeveloped public
lands would be managed to retain their "primeval character and
influence, without permanent improvements of human habitation,
which . . . [are] protected and managed so as to preserve . . . [their]
natural conditions." 127 The baseline of wilderness seemed self-evident.
A closer look, however, reveals a wide margin of deviation. Despite the
general prohibition on commercial or development activity in
wilderness areas, the statute contains exemptions for a wide range of
heavy impact activities resulting from pre-existing uses at the time of
the designation. Thus road building, livestock grazing, and motorized
recreation are allowed to continue. 128 One might argue that these are
not margins of deviation but, rather, the true baseline since they
existed at the time of wilderness designation. This brings to mind the
earlier example of commercial oyster harvesting in the Point Reyes
National Seashore. 129 Keep in mind, though, that the Wilderness Act
went so far as to allow new mining activities in some wilderness areas
located in national forests for twenty years after the Act was
adopted.130
C. Is Gaming Good or Bad?
This Section has provided detailed examples of gaming historic
baselines, but gaming is by no means restricted to historic baselines.
Any kind of standard is susceptible to gaming through use of a healthy
margin of deviation. The same can be said of performance metrics. A
risk-based standard can be softened by adding "to the extent feasible,"
or a technology-based standard could be expressed through loose
metrics such as "industry standards." As the ninety percent mobile
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 283-86.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
Id.
Id. § 1133(d).
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(d).
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sources reduction story makes clear, gaming can take place in the
definition of compliance, and can occur even if the goal is an absolute
emissions cap with no baseline at all. The same is true for the current
climate change debate over carbon taxes versus a cap-and-trade
system. 131 Both systems are susceptible to gaming, with or without
baselines.
It is not the opportunity for gaming that sets historic baselines
apart but, rather, the fact that only historic baselines also have a
temporal reference point. This characteristic adds an additional
dimension for gaming that is lacking in other types of goals. Historic
baselines may not always provide the best fit for particular policies,
but they do provide a qualitatively different opportunity for gaming
than other types of standards. In other words, as the examples in this
Section demonstrate, gaming the temporal reference point can provide
significant political opportunity and administrative flexibility. In this
sense, in many contexts historic baselines should provide greater
capacity for gaming than other standards, and the gaming may be
more easily obscured.
But is a greater or different opportunity for gaming a positive
or negative attribute? To be sure, the story related by Stensvaag is
sobering (and often met with outrage by students in our
environmental law classes). It is not at all clear, however, that this
was a bad result. After all, by the end of the 1970s, catalytic
converters were standard features in cars and trucks, and mobile
source emissions had reduced dramatically. In effect, the testing
methodologies provided a subsidy of sorts to the auto industry, making
compliance easier in the short term. The gaming of the Kyoto baseline
served a similar purpose, placing hot air reductions in the market and
making it easier for parties to meet their reduction obligations.
As a result of gaming historic baselines, political deals have
been reached and laws adopted. As these examples demonstrate,
gaming provides the policy space to address the needs of competing
interests and come up with a final result that works in practice. The
weaker goal that results is surely a downside, but one that must be
balanced against the concrete achievement of a goal fixed in law. Of
course, there can also be too much flexibility in the administration of a
standard, where politics undermine the goal. As with other
instruments and approaches in the policy toolkit, gaming baselines is

131. Tax advocates point out that the allocation of allowances and use of generous offsets can
undermine the cap-and-trade program's integrity, while cap-and-trade proponents argue that tax
credits, deductions, and exemptions can neuter the impacts of carbon taxes. Unfortunately, both
sides are right.
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IV. HISTORIC BASELINES AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
This Article has now identified the basic features of historic
baselines and assessed their respective benefits and costs in setting
regulatory goals, with a focus on the potential for gaming. The
question remains, however, whether this is a useful exercise. How
does a better understanding of historic baselines inform our
understanding of regulatory policy design and implementation?
In answering this "so what?" challenge, this Section turns to
the most pressing regulatory challenge of our time-climate change.
The climate debate has largely evolved into two separate though
related arenas-mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation focuses on
reducing the threats of climate change by reducing the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases. It can be achieved either through
emissions reduction at the source or sequestration of greenhouse gases
through vegetation or technology. Adaptation focuses on minimizing
the harms posed by the climate change that do occur. This is primarily
an engineering or landscape management approach. There is
increasing interest on both these fronts, with governments and
interest groups pushing their own particular goals. In the sections
below, we apply our analysis of historic baselines in the context of
climate change mitigation and adaptation policy.
A. Climate Change Mitigation-TurningBack the Clock
Broadly speaking, mitigation strategies comprise three types of
emissions reduction goals. Interestingly, each of these relies on
historic baselines. The most common goal relies explicitly on a target
based off of a historic baseline. As mentioned above, the Kyoto Protocol
allocated reduction percentages among parties referenced to a 1990
baseline. This strategy also proved popular in negotiations leading up
to the Copenhagen climate summit. Heads of the richest nations, the
G8, called for measures that will avoid a global temperature rise
greater than two degrees centigrade compared to pre-industrial
levels, 132 supplemented by a commitment to collectively reduce
emissions eighty percent by 2050, in the expectation that cuts by

132. Wintour & Elliott, supra note 32, at 14.
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developing countries will result in an overall reduction of fifty
133
percent.
Other nations have also called for targets off baselines. In the
run-up to the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties in 2008, for
example, the Alliance for Small Island States, a coalition of nations
most threatened by climate change, called for global emissions
reductions of over eighty-five percent by 2050 from a 1990 baseline,
with developed countries' reductions over forty percent by 2020 and
ninety-five percent by 2050.134 These reduction targets are anchored in
the goal of limiting temperature increases to below 1.5°C. Though
using different numbers, the European Union, Norway, Iceland,
African nations, and Chile have called for reductions to keep
temperature increases below 2°C. In terms of emissions reductions,

they have called for a fifty percent reduction by 2050 with a 1990
baseline. 135 As negotiations proceed, these numbers will surely change

but the approach of historic baselines likely will not. 136 All of these
targets could have been expressed as tons of emissions at a specified
date in the future, yet every nation feels compelled to introduce
historic baselines as a way of providing a reference point. Historic
baselines are the framing method of choice for mitigation policy.
A second strategy relies on a qualitative target. The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change called on
countries to stabilize greenhouse gases below levels that would cause
"dangerous anthropogenic interference" ("DAI"). 137 As Michael Mann
has pointed out, this goal is not a simple scientific measure. Instead, it
leaves open a number of fundamental policy questions-dangerous to

133. Id.
134. ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), DECLARATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2009

para. 6.b (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http:lwww.sidsnet.orglaosis/documentslAOSIS
%20Summit%2ODeclaration%2OSept%2021%20FINAL.pdf.
135. Id. para. 6.b.v.; see also European Union Communication to the U.N., Limiting Global
Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.europa-euun.org/articles/en/article-6666_en.htm (proposing the same).
136. Indeed, historic baselines have become the universal language of climate change
mitigation policy, as virtually every nation has expressed its preferred greenhouse gas reduction
targets through one or another form of historic baseline using all variety of reference points and
percentages. Canada, for example, has targeted a twenty percent cut from 2006 levels by 2020;
Mexico has targeted a fifty percent cut from 2000 levels by 2050; Japan a twenty-five percent cut
from 1990 levels by 2020; South Korea a four percent cut from 2005 levels by 2020; Russia to
maintain emissions thirty percent below 1990 levels through 2030; and so on. Dean Scott & Eric
J. Lyman, As Hope for Binding Climate Deal Fades, Copenhagen Aims to Be Springboard to
2010, 40 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2733, 2734-35 (Nov. 27, 2009).
137. Michael E. Mann, Defining Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference, 106 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 4065, 4065-66 (2009).
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whom, where, and when? 13 8 Hence this approach leaves ample room
for gaming as well. In practice, efforts to establish DAI targets have
resorted to historic baselines. An advisory group created in the late
1980s by the World Meteorological Organization, the International
Council of Scientific Union, and the United Nations Environment
Program, for example, determined that the threshold for DAI was an
increase of 2 0 C global mean surface warming. 139 Importantly, this
temperature increase was measured from a baseline of pre-industrial
levels. Noted atmospheric physicist James Hansen has more recently
identified a one degree increase as the appropriate threshold measure,
140
compared to pre-industrial temperatures.
The last strategy seems, on its face, to make no use of historic
baselines. This approach sets an absolute target. The best example of
this can be found in the group 350.org. On October 24, 2009, it
sponsored 5,200 events in 181 countries. According to 350.org's
website, this was the most widespread day of environmental action in
history. The goal of all these events was a universal call for binding
emissions targets of 350 ppm. As the group's website makes clear, this
number is not arbitrary: "350 is more than a number-it's a symbol of
where we need to head as a planet,"14 1 and "[i]t's the safety zone for
planet earth."'142 Even here, however, the number comes from a
historic baseline. The website goes on to explain that the purpose of
the 350 ppm goal is "to preserve a planet similar to that on which
civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted."' 43 In
other words, the 350 ppm level is calibrated to return the planet to
pre-industrial conditions-a historic baseline in all but name.
The main policy approach for sequestration, the flip side of
reducing emissions, also relies on historic baselines. Popularly known
as REDD (for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation), this approach would provide reduction credits to
144
countries that reverse trends of deforestation and land degradation.
In a simple example, if a country has had an annual deforestation loss

138. Id.
139. V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding DangerousAnthropogenic Interference with the
Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI., 14,245, 14,245
(2008).
140. Id.
141. Mission, 350.ORG, http://www.350.orglen mission (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
142. 350 Science, 350.ORG, http:/www.350.org/en/about/science (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
143. Id.
144. For a general explanation of REDD, see REDD: Protecting Climate, Forests and
Livelihoods,

INT'L

INST.

ENV'T

&

DEV.,

http://www.iied.org/natural-resources/key-issues/

forestry/redd-protecting-climate-forests-and-livelihoods (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
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of three percent over the last ten years, it would gain credits or be
paid for reducing this rate of loss (for example, down to a one percent
annual loss or even an increase in forest cover). There is strong
support for variants of this approach, and REDD will likely be an
integral part of any future climate treaty. Obviously, in order to
determine the relative improvements in deforestation rates, REDD
will have to be based on a historic baseline approach.
In all instances, therefore, mitigation strategies build off
historic baselines. The target and REDD approaches do so explicitly.
Even the qualitative target of DAI and the absolute target of 350 ppm
are implicitly tied to a time in our history when the greenhouse gas
concentrations were not dangerous. This is then projected forward for
current emissions targets. In the world of mitigation, then, historic
baselines are inevitable. The situation is far different with adaptation.
B. Adaptation Policy-Hittingthe Reset Button
Climate change adaptation "refers to adjustment in natural or
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or
their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities."'1 45 As early as 1990, many held the view that "[i]t is
likely that no matter what policy actions we take, fully arresting the
climate warming is just not in the cards .... And so the likelihood is
that humanity will have to adapt to some climate changes."'146 Until
recently, however, the domestic policy pendulum has swung sharply in
mitigation's direction, and "interest in adaptation was overwhelmed
by concern about the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations."'147 Indeed, the
need for an effective mitigation policy increasingly was portrayed as so
pressing that talk of adaptation became taboo, an admission of
surrender to the goal of reducing emissions. 148 Today, however, it is
clear that so-called committed warming-the climate change already
built into the system as a result of past greenhouse gas emissions145. Glossary of Climate Change Terms, EPA http://www.epa.gov/climatechange
glossary.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
146. Robert M. White, The Great Climate Debate, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 346, 355
(1990).
147. E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton, Understanding Adaptation: Origins, Concepts,
Practice and Policy, in THE EARTHScAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 7 (E.
Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton eds., 2009).
148. See id. (" '[Aldaptationists' were distrusted because their proposals seemed to
undermine the need for mitigation. Critics felt that belief in the potential value of adaptation
would soften the resolve of governments to grasp the nettle of mitigation and thus play into the
hands of the fossils fuel interests and the climate change sceptics.").
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will play out for many decades, even if a political or technological
mitigation breakthrough happened yesterday. 149 Recent policy
dialogue has thus increasingly recognized that formulating and
implementing adaptation strategies must be an urgent and prominent
component of our domestic climate change law and policy. 150
What role can historic baselines play in closing this "adaptation
deficit"? 151 As outlined above, mitigation policy has with good reason
depended on historic baselines to establish emission reduction and
sequestration goals, and is likely to continue to do so. This Section
outlines reasons why, as attractive as historic baselines may be to
policymakers forging new climate change adaptation strategies,
ultimately such baselines will fail to deliver the same foundation for
adaptation policy that they have built in the mitigation policy context.
First, consider the policy goals. Climate change adaptation is
designed to facilitate one or more of the following outcomes for local
and regional human populations and for other species and their
ecosystems:
(1) resist the effects of climate change to maintain the status
quo;

149. See Richard A. Kerr, How Urgent Is Climate Change?, 318 SCIENCE 1230, 1230 (2007)
("The system has built in time lags. Ice sheets take centuries to melt after a warming. The
atmosphere takes decades to be warmed by today's greenhouse gas emissions."); Ramanathan &
Feng, supra note 139, at 14,251 (estimating committed warming of 2.4 degrees Celsius even if
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible
Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009)
(estimating a 1000-year committed warming effect). For an in-depth examination of this lag
effect and the resistance it is likely to generate against costly mitigation policy measures that
may take decades to produce results, see Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1301-05, 1311-34 (2009).
150. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMoRY L.J. 1, 17 (2009) ("Unfortunately,
legislators and regulators in the United States and elsewhere have only begun to consider the
role of adaptation in combating climate change."); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change:
Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007) ("Adaptation has been a neglected topic.
... In my view, this is a mistake."); Peter Hayes, Resilience as Emergent Behavior, 15 HASTINGS
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 175 (2009) ("[Ihe main game is now adaptation which renders
mitigation no less urgent, but shifts the political equation in dramatic ways that cannot be
ignored any longer."); Thomas Lovejoy, Mitigation and Adaptation for Ecosystem Protection, 39
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,072, 10,073 (2009) ("The adaptation part of the climate
change agenda is only just beginning to get attention, and needs much more right away."); Ileana
M. Porras, The City and InternationalLaw: In Pursuit of Sustainable Development, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 537, 593 (2009) ('Most climate change experts and policy-makers recognize that
adaptation and mitigation are not mutually exclusive strategies but must, on the contrary be
employed in tandem.").
151. For the term "adaptation deficit," (losses incurred by ineffective use of available
knowledge about climate change), see Ian Burton, Climate Change and the Adaptation Deficit, in
THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 147, at 90-92.
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(2) transform physical, social, environmental, or economic
conditions to minimize harm or maximize benefits
associated with climate change impacts; or
(3) move humans or other species to areas with better adaptive
capacities.
Take as examples the city of Miami, Florida, and the nearby
Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve, which the state of Florida established
in 1974 "to be preserved in an essentially natural condition so that its
biological and aesthetic values may endure for the enjoyment of future
generations."' 152 These human and natural environments face
substantial threats from climate change impacts, such as sea level
rise, introduction and loss of species, loss of coastal resources, and
more frequent and intensive storm events. Miami's city managers and
the Preserve's resource managers could adopt any of the three
adaptation policy goals. Each could rely on historic baselines. In each
case, however, historic baselines will not prove as effective as other
types of standards. To be sure, historic baselines are quite appealing
to policies aimed at resisting climate change to secure the status quo.
After all, historic baselines such as "no net loss" seem to do just that;
so why not use them if we want Miami and the Preserve to stay just
the way they are through the era of climate change? The answer is
simple-it is not possible to keep Miami and the Preserve just the way
they are through the era of climate change.
Natural resources managers have come to the sober conclusion
that climate change is fundamentally different from the kind of
ecological change they are used to managing. Resource management
has evolved well past conceptions of nature as static and "balanced."
With ecology in particular, the trend over the past half-century has
been increasingly to focus on the complex flux qualities of ecosystems
and to place less emphasis on conceptions of stasis and natural
stability. 15 3 Nevertheless, the "dynamic equilibrium" model that is
now firmly in place in ecology is based on the assumption of
"stationarity," which, as P.C.D. Milly explains, is "the idea that
natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of
variability."'154 Although ecologists understand that the envelope can
be stretched by natural and anthropogenic events, "justifiably or not,

152. FLA. STAT. § 258.397 (2010).
153. See Bryan Norton, Change, Constancy, and Creativity: The New Ecology and Some Old
Problems, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 49, 53-55 (1996) (discussing the increased focus on
ecological change over the last fifty years).
154. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE
573, 573 (2008).
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they generally have considered natural change and variability to be
sufficiently small to allow stationarity-based design."'155 Thus,
conservation programs, such as the ESA, the Wilderness Act, and the
National Wildlife Refuge System, to this day depend heavily on the
156
strategy of setting aside habitat reserves to preserve the status quo,
and even newer, more flexible conservation orientations, such as
ecosystem-based management, depend strongly on the stationarity
premise and its appeal to "natural" and "native" models of ecosystem
157
dynamics.
But the stationarity premise is on shaky ground in the era of
climate change. Ecologists now warn of the no-analog futureecological variability unprecedented in the history of ecology, riddled
with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously unknown
emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change. 158 The

155. Id.
156. See Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32
WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 175, 204-10 (arguing that nature preserves strive to create a static
environment that minimizes future human interference with natural habitats).
157. See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
27, 30-31 (1994) (advocating describing a feature of ecosystem management as management of
ecosystems for their "native" properties); Bruce Pardy, Ecosystem Management in Question: A
Reply to Ruhl, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (2005) (proposing management of ecosystems
for "natural" conditions). For arguments against retaining these conceptions of "nature" as the
policy driver in environmental law, see J.B. Ruhl, The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under
Ecosystem Management: A Response to Pardy, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 315, 319-23 (2005); J.B.
Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV- Narrowing and Sharpening
the Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 30-31 (2007).
158. Matthew C. Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution
Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255
(2009) ("By 2100, a quarter or more of the Earth's land surface may experience climatic
conditions that have no modern analog... "); Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316
SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007) ("I]f the climate changes over the next 100 years as current models
predict, surviving species throughout much of Earth's land area . .. are likely to be reshuffled
into novel ecosystems unknown today."); Douglas Fox, When Worlds Collide, CONSERVATION,
Jan.-Mar. 2007, at 28 (arguing that it is likely that the world will enter into a no-analog future
within 100-200 years). The scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and exposing
our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as temperature rises is legion. See, e.g., Almut
Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the Planet?, 326 SCIENCE 672, 672-73 (2009) (examining the
feedback effects between conventional air pollution control and climate change mitigation and
concluding that complex positive and negative feedback links exist and that, on balance, the
evidence and models suggest that "air pollution control will accelerate warming in the coming
decades"); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate
Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1444, 1444-48 (2008) (explaining the complex and nonlinear
forest-climate interactions); 1. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlaufer, Nonlinear Threshold Behavior
During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 28 (2009) (describing the nonlinear
"tipping points" in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet & Albert Galy, HimalayaCarbon Sink or Source?, 320 SCIENCE 1727, 1727-28 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of the
sinks and sources of the carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance,
Carbon, and Climate, 321 SCIENCE 652, 653 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecological
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"envelope" of variability will not merely grow in size, it will change in
basic structure, and no analog exists in the history of ecology,
including paleoecology for that matter, for predicting its new ground
rules. Thus, climate change, in the words of the FWS, "is the transformational conservation challenge of our time, not only because of its
direct effects, but also because of its influence on the other stressors
that have been and will continue to be, major conservation
priorities." 159 As biologist Young Choi emphatically sums up the
challenge of climate change adaptation, "[w]e need to admit our
inability to restore an ecosystem to its very original state. We cannot
160
go back to our nostalgic past!"'
Building adaptation strategies around historic baselines to
resist climate change thus is a losing proposition. 16' Miami, for
example, might build seawalls, use pesticides to control invasive
disease-bearing insects and parasites, import more sand, energy, and
water to support its beach tourism industry, and establish health
management systems to deal with increased disease. Even well before
climate change became a concern, coastal communities in particular
tenaciously clung to the status quo through such measures, so there is
little reason to believe they will abandon the status quo willingly in
the face of climate change. 162 Similarly, the Preserve managers, whose
mission has been to maintain a historic baseline, might work tirelessly

sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics); Daniel B. Fagre et al., Thresholds of
Change in Ecosystems 36-74 (draft, Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.
climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-2/public-review-draft/sap4-2-prd.pdf (examining numerous
positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in climate change dynamics).
159. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR

RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (draft, Sept. 21, 2009).
160. Yong D. Choi, Restoration Ecology to the Future: A Call for New Paradigm, 15
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 351, 351 (2007).

161. For an extensive discussion in the context of species conservation, see Alejandro E.
Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate
Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 225-43 (2010). Camacho concludes that "the goal of preserving
or restoring resources to a historic baseline that currently dominates natural resource policy will
be increasingly difficult if not impossible to sustain." Id. at 244.
162. For example, beach renourishment projects, while not generally motivated today by
climate change concerns, are representative of the property disputes likely to arise as
communities take measures to enhance coastal technological and natural resources to defend
against sea level rise and more frequent and more intense storm surges. See Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597-600 (2010) (describing
such a dispute). The case arose out of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Walton County v.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), in which the court found a state
beach renourishment statute that fixed property boundaries for littoral property owners did not
constitute a taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 2600. For an in-depth
discussion of the case, see Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 19, 45-51 (2009).
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to import water, soils, and other resources to prop up wetlands and
corals diminished from climate change. They may intervene to prevent
species from moving into or out of Biscayne Bay in response to climate
change. But in neither case are these strategies likely to work in the
long run. For Miami and the Preserve, the cost of maintaining the
status quo with no margin of deviation is likely to become prohibitive
at the very least, and infeasible in many respects. Sticking rigidly to
historic baselines could become counterproductive to other policy goals
in those circumstances. On a macro regional or national scale,
moreover, the "resist" strategy cannot be uniformly maintained-to
the extent managing numerous areas such as Miami and the Preserve
for the status quo depends on importing water, energy, or other
resources from somewhere else, then obviously not every human and
natural environment can be managed for the status quo.
The transformative effects climate change will have on
conceptions of variability and change in human and natural
environments thus undermines the very premise of resist strategies. If
status quo were nonetheless the expressed goal of an adaptation policy
for places like Miami and the Preserve, the use of historic baselines
would have to place primary design emphasis on the margin of
deviation, which would need to accommodate significant departures
from the temporal reference point conditions. It would be as if the "no
net loss" policy had been framed as the 'lots of net loss" policy, at
which point the adaptation goal looks less like resisting to maintain
the status quo and more like transforming to deal with change. Resist
strategies and their historic baselines, in other words, will be
swamped by climate change into a focus on how far off the status quo
conditions have moved.
Given that resist strategies in areas such as Miami and
Biscayne Bay are likely to devolve into "transform" strategies, historic
baselines seem particularly inappropriate. Transform strategies
assume that maintaining the status quo or restoring conditions to a
past state are either not feasible or not desirable policy goals. A
standard like "no net loss" or "pre-European conditions" has little
meaning in that context. Rather, transform strategies assume that
transition and change are integral parts of the program and set goals
for the future, irrespective of the past. Is a historic baseline approach
even possible when climate change has obliterated the baseline?
Miami's city managers, for example, may hope to replace beach
tourism with some other form of tourism, and the Preserve's managers
may decide to replace species-specific goals with goals such as
conserving an overall mix of biodiversity without regard to species
assemblage. What passes as "natural conditions," in other words, is no
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longer referenced from the past but rather from the anticipated
future. Historic baselines, though, could be designed around such
policies. For example, a rolling baseline could be used to measure
average changes in tourism categories or species categories. But in
that context the historic baseline is simply a "soft" regulatory
instrument, a measurement tool used to test implementation
techniques, not a "hard" regulatory tool used to establish and enforce
implementation goals. It is far more likely that standards based on
risk, technological feasibility, and cost will drive policy decisions in a
dynamic environment with only partially informed conceptions of
what the world is supposed to look like on the "other side" of climate
change, other than it will not look anything like the past.
An even more compelling case can be made against using
historic baselines in support of move strategies for climate change
adaptation. If people decide to leave Miami or other areas, or if
resource managers decide to engage actively in assisted migration of
species, that reflects a decision that the status quo or restoration to a
past set of conditions are not feasible goals and that transformation
with change in situ is not viable either. 163 History and the status quo
are at that point irrelevant policy tools. Even using historic baselines
to guide carrying capacity decisions-for example, to establish how
many people or species members can move out of an area or into an
area-is not useful when the carrying capacities also are changing due
to climate change. Using historic baselines in these adaptation
settings could prove foolish if not dangerous.
C. Going Forward
Our examination of historic baselines in climate change policy
thus suggests that (1) mitigation and adaptation polices are distinct
and must be designed with their respective attributes in mind, and (2)
historic baselines provide a very good match with the attributes of
mitigation policy, but not with those of adaptation policy. Put another
way, even though people often speak of mitigation and adaptation as
two sides of the same coin, they are actually very different, even to the
level of goal structure, and we need to be careful not to let the facility
of baselines in mitigation shift over to adaptation without recognizing
these fundamental differences. Historic baselines are directly
implicated in only one side of the climate debate. For climate

163. See Camacho, supra note 161, at 223 ("Assisted migration directly contradicts this focal
management goal of preserving or restoring natural resources to a static historic baseline.").
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mitigation, they are unavoidable, and that is probably a good thing.
For adaptation policies, by contrast, they are maladapted.
Our concern is that, notwithstanding these limitations of
historic baselines in support of resist, transform, and move strategies
for climate change adaptation, historic baselines will prove irresistible
to policymakers designing adaptation standards. The gaming success
historic baselines have had thus far in mitigation policy could delude
policymakers into believing that they can also finesse adaptation
policies from historic baselines. Adaptation policy, moreover, is
directly about the kind of change people fear, making explicit
discussion of risk, technology, and cost less palatable for politicians.
Just as with "no net loss," historic baselines could be attractive to
policymakers as a means of masking and deferring the tough policy
decisions on risk, technology, and cost. As the "no net loss" experience
has shown, however, unless carefully designed and monitored, gaming
can creep in to make performance measurement less reliable and thus
distort long-term assessment of the standard's performance. As
difficult as it has been thus far to assess whether "no net loss" has
been a successful wetlands conservation standard, imagine how
difficult it will be to evaluate after fifty years of accelerated climate
change whether "natural" wetland conditions around the nation have
fundamentally changed. 164 Policymakers therefore should resist the
temptation to assume that the facility of historic baselines in
mitigation policy can be imported to adaptation policy, and should
instead build adaptation policy on explicit risk, technology, and cost
standards.
CONCLUSION

Every method of standard setting in regulatory policy leverages
its own unique attribute. An extensive scholarship explores how riskbased standards use risk analysis; how absolute standards use hard
quantification; how technology-based standards use engineering
knowledge; and how cost-based standards use economic cost-benefit
analysis. By contrast, there has been virtually no consideration of how

164. Some researchers believe that, while wetland conditions at any one location are likely to
degrade or improve with climate change, overall the United States will experience no net loss
and perhaps even some gain of wetland resources as a result of climate change. See Matthew L.
Kirwan et al., Latitudinal Trends in Spartina Alterniflora Productivity and the Response of
Coastal Marshes to Global Climate Change, 15 GLOBAL CLIMATE BIOLOGY 1982, 1986-87 (2009)
(climate change may increase total productivity and ecosystem services of coastal wetlands). This
assumes, of course, that areas likely to transition into new or expanded wetlands are not
converted to some other land use before then.
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historic baselines operate-a serious gap given the widespread use of
historic baselines by Congress and agencies.
To fill that gap, this Article has explored in detail the
attributes and operation of historic baselines. That historic baselines
are found throughout regulatory law is no accident. Particularly when
the policy goal involves turning back the clock or halting an
undesirable trend, historic baselines have distinct advantages
compared to alternative techniques for standard setting. These
advantages include rhetoric, familiarity, and flexibility. The use of the
temporal reference point lies at the heart of what makes historic
baselines distinct in this respect, yet it is also what makes them
qualitatively different for purposes of gaming. Leveraging the past
provides an additional dimension to the gaming potential found in
other techniques, such as technology- or cost-based goals.
This very attraction, however, equally limits historic baselines
in some contexts. This limitation is most evident in climate change
adaptation policy, where baselines simply do not easily fit because the
policy goal is fundamentally about resetting the clock, not turning it
back. There is no past to leverage when it comes to climate change
adaptation. This may be true in other cases where massively
transformative forces are at work, such as with the global financial
crisis. Going back to the past may be appealing in these settings, but
it is ultimately infeasible. Policymakers reaching for a more forwardlooking policy thus should eye warily the appeal to the past embedded
in historic baselines.

The Inauthentic Claim
64 Vand. L. Rev. 61 (2011)
Anthony J. Sebok
This Article argues that third parties should be able to invest
in lawsuits to a much greater degree than is currently permitted in
most jurisdictionsin the United States. The laws of assignment and
maintenance limit the freedom of litigants to sell all or part of their
lawsuits to strangers. I argue in the Article that the foundation of
both doctrines is based on something I call the theory of "the
inauthenticclaim."
The theory of the inauthentic claim asserts that there is a
quality, separate and in addition to legal validity, which confers
"authenticity" to a lawsuit. The theory does not presuppose that
"inauthentic"lawsuits are more likely to be spurious, fraudulent, or
frivolous than "authentic"lawsuits. It holds, instead, that the mere
fact that a third party involved him- or herself in the suit for the
wrong reasons (either by taking an assignment in the suit or
supportingthe suit), is proof that the suit is againstpublic policy.
The theory of the inauthentic claim is important because it
plays an important role in restrainingtransactionsbetween litigants
and third parties today. The law of assignment, while much more
liberal than it was at the time of Blackstone, still forbids the
assignment of numerous causes of action, including suits for
personal injury and fraud. The law of maintenance has not been
liberalized nearly as much as the law of assignment, and there is an
active debate occurring within the courts and among policymakers
today about whether to allow increased investment in litigation.
This Article examines two arguments that might be used to
defend the theory of the inauthentic claim, one from history and one
from jurisprudence.In my opinion, neither argument is persuasive. I
conclude the Article by sketching a research agenda based on
empirical evidence that would help policymakers and judges choose
the socially optimal set of rules for third-party investment in
litigation.

